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Résumé 
En s’inspirant de l’exemple des défis corporatifs, c’est-à-dire, des initiatives 
déployées par les sociétés pour rendre le marché de l’emploi plus accessible aux 
membres de groupes perçus comme marginalisés, ce mémoire cherche à analyser le 
conflit qui pourrait surgir au Québec entre le droit à la vie privé, protégé notamment 
par la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels dans le secteur privé1 et la 
Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels et des documents électroniques2 
et le besoin croissant de l’entreprise d’utiliser les données privées de leurs employés 
pour vendre leurs biens et services. 
Dans un premier temps, ce mémoire effectue un survol des régimes de protection de 
la vie privée des pays qui ont le plus influencé le droit québécois et canadien soit 
l’Europe, les États-Unis et le Royaume Uni en soulignant leur influence sur le régime 
en vigueur au Québec. Dans un second temps, il soulève les entraves que posent la 
LPRPS et la LPRPDE à la participation de l’entreprise aux défis corporatifs. Dans un 
troisième temps, il explore des pistes possibles à la fois interprétatives, législatives et 
contentieuses afin de rendre ces lois plus accommodantes aux besoins de 
l’entreprise.     
Mots clé : Militantisme du consommateur; Charte canadienne des droits et libertés; 
défis corporatifs; expression commerciale; Loi sur la protection des renseignements 
personnels dans le secteur privé; Loi sur la protection des renseignements 
personnels et des documents électroniques; Québec; vie privée. 
                                            
1 P-39.1. (“LPRPS”).  
2 L.C. 2000, ch.5. (“LPRPDE”). 
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Summary 
This essay uses the example of Industry Challenges - a technique deployed by 
companies to promote the hiring and advancement of certain members of society - to 
explore a conflict that could arise in Quebec between the individual’s right to privacy 
as protected by An Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information In the 
Private Sector1 and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents 
Act2, and that of an organisation to use personal information relating to its workforce 
to market itself. It briefly reviews privacy protection in jurisdictions with the greatest 
legal influence on Quebec and Canada: the European Union, the United States and 
the United Kingdom (Chapter 2). It demonstrates how a blend of these influences is 
reflected in the Quebec and Canadian approaches to privacy and how existing 
privacy legislation might prevent a company from effectively and efficiently 
responding to Industry Challenges (Chapter 3). Finally, the last two chapters 
respectively explore the interpretive and legislative amendments that could be made 
to PPIPS and PIPEDA to enable companies to respond to Industry Challenges 
(Chapter 4) as well as the possible legal action a company could take on the ground 
that Quebec’s privacy legislation violates its right to express itself commercially under 
s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 (Chapter 5). 
Key words: An Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private 
Sector; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; Commercial Expression; 
                                            
1 Chapter P-39.1 (“PPIPS”).. 
2 S.C. 2000, c. 5 (“PIPEDA”). 
3 Constitution Act, 1982 R.S.C., 1985, App.II, no 44. 
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Consumer Activism; Industry Challenge(s); Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act; Privacy; Quebec. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Privacy and Industry Challenges 
In 2013 the Supreme Court of Canada (“Supreme Court”), in Alberta (Information 
and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 4011, 
held Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act2 to be unconstitutional for violating 
a union’s right to express itself as per s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms3. The case concerned Local 401 of the United Food and Commercial 
Worker’s Union’s (“Local 401”) recording and photographing employees crossing the 
picket line. Following a complaint to the Alberta Information and Privacy 
Commissioner, the Commission-appointed adjudicator found Local 401’s behaviour to 
have violated Alberta PIPA. Local 401 challenged the constitutionality of the 
legislation and, on judicial review, Alberta PIPA was found to have breached the 
union’s right to express itself pursuant to s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter. The Alberta 
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court both upheld the decision. The Alberta 
legislature received twelve months to bring Alberta PIPA in line with the Canadian 
constitution. What is most interesting in this decision is the court’s reiteration that 
rights are not absolute and the importance it attributes to a purposeful interpretation 
of them. Abella and Cromwell JJ. write: “[i]t is enough to note that, like privacy, 
freedom of expression is not an absolute value and both the nature of the privacy 
                                            
1 [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733 (“U.F.C.W.”). 
2 S.A. 2003, Chapter P-6.5 (“Alberta PIPA”). 
3 Constitution Act, 1982 R.S.C., 1985, App.II, no 44 (“Canadian Charter”). 
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interests implicated and the nature of the expression must be considered in striking 
an appropriate balance”.4   
The potential implications of U.F.C.W. on the notion of privacy are far reaching - 
especially at present when privacy must compete with other compelling interests such 
as security and law enforcement, advertising and marketing, or even health-care, 
social justice and equality. For example, whose interests should prevail when a 
company wishes to participate in or implement programmes encouraging the 
advancement of members of certain under-represented groups in a particular industry 
sector and that requires access to its workplace demographics to do so? Should the 
company be permitted to harness whatever available technology to collect, use, and 
communicate employees’ Personal Information (as defined in Chapter 3) without their 
consent? What if a staff member refuses consent?  
These are neither negligible nor unrealistic queries for goods and services providers 
in an age of consumer and industry activism in which decisions to purchase are no 
longer based solely on price and quality but on a number of other factors ranging from 
environmental consciousness to gender and social parity. Indeed, a growing trend 
among American companies is to launch “challenges” (“Industry Challenges” as 
defined below) in their procurement documents aimed at increasing the number of 
employees belonging to certain socio-economic, gender, and cultural groups and to 
which suppliers must respond if they wish their goods or services to be retained. This 
trend has become so strong that many goods and services providers, in an 
                                            
4 Supra note 1 at 753.  
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anticipatory gesture, institute their own programs and initiatives to increase gender 
and cultural diversity which they then promote in their marketing materials. In fact, 
these various diversity initiatives often become a form of advertising or commercial 
expression. In Quebec, however, companies that wish to respond to Industry 
Challenges or advertise certain types of diversity initiatives, soon encounter obstacles 
in the form of privacy legislation. Be it by the Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act5 or An Act Respecting the Protection Of Personal 
Information In the Private Sector6, organisations are prevented, except in very limited 
circumstances, from collecting, using or communicating any personal information 
about their employees without their employees’ specific and express consent.  
In the absence of either case law or doctrine on the matter, this essay seeks to 
explore the tension that exists at present between Quebec’s private sector privacy 
legislation and a company’s right to use workforce demographics to market itself – a 
practice that arguably constitutes a form of commercial expression. It questions 
whether the blanket protection of personal information provided by PPIPS and 
PIPEDA is still relevant and effective and what interpretive or legislative changes 
should be made to these acts to enable them to accommodate responses to Industry 
Challenges. Before turning to these questions, however, the next few pages review 
what is meant by privacy as well as by an Industry Challenge.  
1.1 What is Privacy? 
Although frequently invoked, privacy remains a notion that is difficult to define with 
                                            
5 S.C. 2000, c. 5 (“PIPEDA”). 
6 Chapter P-39.1 (“PPIPS”). 
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any degree of consensus. Is it a human right - that is to say an inviolable claim of the 
individual on the society to which he or she belongs – or a property right that can be 
bartered or sold? Is it a right at all or perhaps more of a legal concept? Does the 
answer to any of these questions ultimately affect the protection we afford privacy?  
Ironically, while Europe, the United States, and Canada have signed many of the 
same treaties recognising the right to privacy, they do not interpret this right the same 
way.7 Even within Canada, explicit privacy protection is not uniform. Indeed, at the 
federal level, privacy, per se is not guaranteed by the Canadian Charter. Instead it is 
read into the Canadian Charter’s sections 7 and 8 that respectively protect the right to 
life, liberty and security of the person, and against unreasonable search and seizure. 
In the province of Quebec, however, section 5 of the Quebec Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms8 as well as articles 35 to 40 of the Civil Code of Quebec9, 
                                            
7 For example, Article 12 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “[n]o one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his 
honor and reputation”, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. Article 17 of The International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation”, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx Likewise, while European members states, the 
United States and Canada are all members of the OECD, the United States has not implemented a federal law 
reflecting the eight principles of the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data, 
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata
.htm.  
8 “Every person has a right to respect for his private life.” CQLR, c. C-12, (“Quebec Charter”). 
9 “Art. 35. Every person has a right to the respect of his reputation and privacy. 
No one may invade the privacy of a person without the consent of the person unless authorized by law.  
Art. 36. The following acts, in particular, may be considered as invasions of the privacy of a person: 
(1) Entering or taking anything in his dwelling; 
(2) Intentionally intercepting or using his private communications; 
(3) Appropriating or using his image or voice while he is in private premises; 
(4) Keeping his private life under observation by any means; 
(5) Using his name, image, likeness or voice for a purpose other than the legitimate information of the public; 
(6) Using his correspondence, manuscripts or other personal documents. 
 
Art. 37. Every person who establishes a file on another person shall have a serious and legitimate reason for 
doing so. He may gather only information which is relevant to the stated objective of the file, and may not, 
without the consent of the person concerned or authorization by the law, communicate such information to 
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recognise a right to privacy and enumerate what constitutes its breach. Neither law, 
however, explicitly defines the right. In other Canadian provinces such as British 
Columbia,10 Manitoba,11 Saskatchewan,12 and Newfoundland and Labrador13 privacy 
is protected by several statutory torts. In Ontario, it was recognised in 2012 under the 
Common Law as “intrusion upon seclusion”, in Jones v. Tsige,14 and more recently as 
“public disclosure of private facts”, in Jane Doe 464533 v. ND15. So then what is 
meant by a right to privacy?  
1.1.1 The Evolution of Privacy 
An approach that is frequently adopted to analyse privacy is to review the evolution of 
its protection. Alan Westin, in his classic work, Privacy and Freedom, shows concerns 
for privacy to have existed in what might be labeled pre-modern societies and argues 
                                                                                                                                         
third persons or use it for purposes that are inconsistent with the purposes for which the file was established. 
In addition, he may not, when establishing or using the file, otherwise invade the privacy or injure the 
reputation of the person concerned.  
 
Art. 38. Except as otherwise provided by law, any person may, free of charge, examine and cause the rectification 
of a file kept on him by another person with a view to making a decision in his regard or to informing a third 
person; he may also cause a copy of it to be made at reasonable cost. The information contained in the file 
shall be made accessible in an intelligible transcript.  
 
Art. 39. A person keeping a file on a person may not deny him access to the information contained therein unless 
he has a serious and legitimate reason for doing so or unless the information may seriously injure a third 
person. 
 
Art. 40. Every person may cause information which is contained in a file concerning him and which is inaccurate, 
incomplete or equivocal to be rectified; he may also cause obsolete information or information not justified by 
the purpose of the file to be deleted, or deposit his written comments in the file. 
Notice of the rectification is given without delay to every person having received the information in the 
preceding six months and, where applicable, to the person who provided that information. The same rule 
applies to an application for rectification, if it is contested.” S.Q. 1991, c.64, (“CCQ”). 
10 The Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373. 
11 The Privacy Act, CCSM c P125. 
12 The Privacy Act, RSS 1978, Chapter P-24. 
13 The Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, Chapter P-22.  
14 2012, ONCA, 32. 
15 [2016] O.J. No. 382, 2016 ONSC 541. 
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that “the notion put forward by legal commentators from Brandeis down to the present 
– that privacy was somehow a ‘modern’ legal right which began to take form only in 
the late nineteenth century – is simply bad history and bad law”.16  Nevertheless, as 
Eloise Gratton points out, it is generally agreed that privacy protection has evolved 
through three phases. During the first phase, privacy was associated with Justice 
Cooley’s definition, as the right to be left alone, and with Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis’ article, “The Right to Privacy”, that criticised the press’ use of technology, 
such as instantaneous photography, to invade domestic life.17 The second phase, 
which was largely in reaction to the atrocities of the Second World War, interpreted 
privacy to mean “respect for one’s private and family life, his home and his 
correspondences”.18 Finally, the third phase, that began in the 1960s, conceptualized 
privacy as the right for individuals to control their personal information.19 The main 
threat to privacy was deemed to come from automated data banks, the amount of 
information they could store, and the distances over which they could transmit data. 
As a result, the fair information practices (“FIP”s) around which much of our present 
privacy legislation, such as PPIPS and PIPEDA, are structured reflect an attempt to 
enable individuals to retain control over the information that concerns them.20 These 
FIPs include the right to know that information is being collected, the right to know the 
                                            
16 NY, IG Publishing, 1967 at 377. 
17Gratton, Eloise, Understanding Personal Information: Managing Privacy Risks, Markham, ON, Lexis Nexis 
Canada Inc., 2013 at 2. 
18 Ibid., at 3. 
19 Ibid., at 6. 
20 Ibid., at 15. 
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use to which it will be put as well as how to correct any inaccuracies.21  
In addition to the above three phases – or waves -  Gratton proceeds to question 
whether with the advent of the Web 2.0, social media, and “big data”, not to mention 
drones and other technological devises that have the ability to render privacy 
obsolete, it might be accurate to speak of a fourth wave of privacy protection in which 
society now finds itself.22 She notes “[t]he recent changes triggered by the Internet 
and related technologies are important enough to suggest that we have entered a 
fourth wave, and we should therefore go back to the drawing board”.23 But before 
returning to the drawing board, a few words on the importance of privacy are 
warranted. 
1.1.2 The Importance of Privacy 
Over the past fifty years many authors have struggled to define privacy and explain its 
importance. For example, Westin states that “[p]rivacy is the claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others”.24 He describes its importance to 
personal and organisational development. According to Westin, whereas privacy 
allows for the autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation and limited and protected 
communication necessary to individuals in democratic societies,25 it provides 
organisations in these same societies with the organizational autonomy, release from 
public roles, evaluative periods for decision making and protected communications 
                                            
21 Ibid., at 10. 
22 Ibid., at 56. 
23 Ibid.  
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they need to thrive.26  
More recently, an author whose definition has been retained by the Supreme Court27 
is Chris Hunt who defines the right to privacy as: 
“X’s claim to be free from unwanted sensorial access in relation to 
information and activities which are intimate; or, if not intimate, 
information and activities which are personal in the sense that most 
people in our society would not want them to be widely known or 
widely observed; or, if neither intimate nor personal, information and 
activities about which X feels acutely sensitive and in which he 
claims a privacy interest.”28  
Hunt provides two philosophical approaches to justify the importance of privacy. He 
explains that from a deontological perspective, privacy is valuable because it provides 
“dignity and autonomy”29 and it preserves the individual’s right to shape their 
destiny30. Violating this right to privacy places the violator’s choice above that of the 
victim, demonstrates disrespect for the victim and, in essence, transforms the victim 
from subject to object as he or she no longer controls the choices that concern him or 
her.31 From a consequentialist perspective privacy fosters: 1. the individual’s 
development by providing a place where they are free from the social pressure to 
conform -;32 2. his or her ability to form relationships – since keeping some aspects of 
                                                                                                                                         
24 Supra note 6 at 5.  
25 Ibid. at 35. 
26 Ibid. at 46-56. 
27 See for example U.F.C.W. or R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43. (“Spencer”). 
28 Hunt, Chris D.L., “Conceptualizing Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: Foundational Considerations for the 
Development of Canada’s Fledgling Privacy Tort”, (2011) 37 Queen’s L.J. 167, p.217-218. 
29 Ibid. at 203. 
30 Ibid. at 207. 
31 Ibid. at 203-209. 
32 Ibid. at 210 
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oneself private are the heart of intimacy -;33 and 3. his or her participation in a liberal 
society since principles of dignity and autonomy are at the very core of liberal 
society34. Violating this privacy, therefore, destroys the person’s development as an 
individual, his or her ability to form relationships and ultimately the development of his 
or her society.35 The strength of Hunt’s definition is its implicit recognition that 
individuals do not all have the same sensitivities with respect to what they consider to 
be their private lives. Its weakness lies in its failure to consider that the importance 
societies and individuals attribute to privacy may not be static but wax and wane in 
response to other competing rights and interests. Either way, it is difficult to build a 
legal definition of privacy from Hunt’s study. 
1.1.3 Privacy as a Concept 
Perhaps instead of speaking of privacy as a right in absolute terms, it might be more 
accurate to speak as Jean-Louis Halpérin does, of privacy as a concept, that is, an 
artifact produced by the human mind for the specific world of law.36 Characterising 
privacy as a shifting border, a rampart built by law to protect against encroachments 
from other private persons, such as the press or other organisations possessing 
private information, Halpérin states : “[l]a privacy n’est pas une créance sur des 
individus ou sur la société, elle ne consiste pas non plus dans un droit réel sur une 
chose, c’est la liberté de conserver la tranquillité de sa vie privée sans interférences 
                                            
33 Ibid. at 213. 
34 Ibid. at 216. 
35 Ibid. at 209-217. 
36 Halpérin, Jean-Louis, “L’essor de la ‘privacy’ et l’usage des concepts juridiques”, Droit et Société 61/2005, 765 
at 775. 
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extérieures”.37 The challenge is to establish where, in a given instance, the border 
should be drawn. This is precisely the difficulty that arises when rights to privacy enter 
into conflict with the subject of this essay, Industry Challenges. 
1.2 What is an Industry Challenge 
1.2.1 Definition 
This essay uses the term “Industry Challenge”, that is by no means a term of art, to 
refer to a technique deployed by companies that have undertaken to promote the 
hiring and advancement of certain members of society, notably women, visible 
minorities, and homosexuals/bisexual/transgender (“Target Group”), traditionally 
perceived as marginalised in a particular sector or industry. These Industry 
Challenges, among other things, consist in requiring the company’s goods and 
service providers to commit to its causes. The company thus “challenges” its 
suppliers to espouse its causes failing which they risk losing the company’s business.  
A company typically launches its challenges in its tendering documents in which it 
asks its suppliers to provide information on their diversity programs as well as on the 
number of employees belonging to a Target Group and/or belonging to a Target 
Group and holding management or executive positions within the company. The 
company may also insist that its service providers, such as lawyers or accountants, 
build client teams led by or including a certain percentage of Target Group members. 
It will also reserve the right to privilege or conduct business only with suppliers that 
either employ a satisfactory number of people belonging to the Target Group or that 
                                            
37 Ibid., at 780, 779. 
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have implemented programmes for their advancement or both. Depending upon the 
level of detail required, a Quebec goods or service provider may be asked to give 
specific numbers concerning its employees’ gender and/or their cultural background. 
It may also be asked to provide the professional resumes of members who qualify as 
Target Group members of a proposed client team – a disclosure that amounts to 
“outing” anyone who wished to remain anonymous. A goods or services provider that 
cannot communicate this information in the expected level of detail risks losing the 
company’s business.  
1.2.2 Example 
A perfect illustration of a company capable of launching an Industry Challenge is 
Cummins that uses its commitment to diversity as a central feature of its marketing 
strategy. Its internet site not only lists the number of women holding senior positions 
but promotes a “diversity procurement initiative” which it states “reached its long-
standing goal of $1 billion in spending with diverse suppliers across eight categories 
in 2014, and laid the foundation for future growth”.38 These eight categories include 
minority business enterprises; women business enterprises; service disabled veteran 
owned small businesses; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender owned businesses; 
historically under-utilized business zone businesses; small disadvantaged businesses 
and philanthropic enterprises.39 The Cummins site exemplifies two trends that mark a 
new market reality and that are discussed briefly below: 1. the influence of consumer 
activism on the market – Cummins and companies like it, while perhaps motivated by 
                                            
38 http://sustainability.cummins.com/social/diversity/diversity-procurement 
39 Ibid. At the time of drafting Cummins only listed 7 categories on its web-site. 
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altruism are also responding to what they believe to be an important market trend; 
and 2. workforce demographics and the ability to package these, be it in response to 
Industry Challenges or otherwise, have become a form of advertising or commercial 
expression.  
1.2.3 The Context to Industry Challenges: Consumer Activism 
To fully understand the importance of Industry Challenges and their impact on a 
company’s ability to sell its products, a few words on consumer activism are in order. 
Indeed, it is in response to an increasingly activist market that Industry Challenges 
and other industry-sponsored initiatives for social advancement have developed. 
Without entering into an extensive study of consumer activism, the movement can be 
loosely defined as the belief held by certain consumers that through their purchases 
they are expressing an ethical or moral choice that they believe will have an impact 
beyond their immediate purchase.40 This movement appears to be linked to a belief 
that governments are either unable or unwilling to affect the type of change required 
to remedy certain social inequalities, both domestically and abroad, and therefore, it 
falls to the individual and to the private sector to make the changes governments 
cannot. As Ryan Calo observes, consumers are increasingly moving away from price 
and quality as the main factors motivating decisions to purchase, in favour of socio-
political concerns such as the vendor’s social engagement.41 To attract consumers 
                                            
40 An example of consumer activism is the Responsible Investing movement that refers to the “integration of 
environmental, social, and corporate governance criteria (ESG) into the selection and management of investments 
(“Responsible Investing”). To date, there are 1 trillion dollars of assets under this form of management in 
Canada which represents a 68% increase in the last two years. The investment vehicles typically include stocks, 
bonds, mutual funds, retail venture capital and exchange and traded funds (RIA Canada 
https://riacanada.ca/trendsreport). 
41 “Privacy and Markets: A Love Story”, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-26, 1 at 7.  
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who hold these beliefs, companies develop marketing strategies equating their 
product to the cause in question. Mr. Bedbury, head of marketing at Starbucks and 
former head of marketing at Nike, explains the process as follows: 
[w]ith Starbucks, we see how coffee has woven itself into the fabric of 
people’s lives, and that’s our opportunity for emotional leverage. ….A 
great brand raises the bar – it adds a greater sense of purpose to the 
experience, whether it’s the challenge to do your best in sports and 
fitness or the affirmation that the cup of coffee you’re drinking really 
matters. 42 
 
The example of Responsible Investing and the changes it brought to Canadian 
securities regulations serves as a good illustration of how these market pressures 
function. Indeed, investment managers of funds that qualify as Responsible Investing 
must adhere to the “United Nations-supported Principles for Responsible Investing”43 
that require them to abide by principles that necessitate a certain degree of disclosure 
on the part of the companies seeking to be included in the funds – disclosure of 
information that would typically be deemed personal under PPIPS and PIPEDA. In 
October 2014, however, securities regulators in all Canadian provinces and territories 
except British Columbia, Alberta, and the Yukon amended corporate governance 
disclosure to allow companies to disclose policies regarding the representation of 
                                            
42 Klein, Naomi, No Logo, London, Flamingo, 2000, at 20-21. 
43 1. To incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes; 
2. To be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into ownership policies and practices; 
3. To seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which [they] invest; 
4. To promote acceptance and implementation of the principles within the investment industry; 
5. To work together to enhance effectiveness in implementing the principles; and 
6. To each report on activities and progress towards implementing the principles http://www.unpri.org/about/the-
six-principles. 
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women on boards and in executive positions.44 Companies must now disclose the 
number of women who hold board and executive-officer positions as well as the 
processes in place to increase gender diversity.45 A company’s ability to disclose 
specific numbers on workforce demographics is thus an essential form of advertising 
in a market of socially conscious investors and consumers.  
1.2.4 Industry Challenges and Advertising 
In light of consumer activism described above, a company’s ability to respond to 
Industry Challenges and play to the socio-political demands of its potential 
purchasers is a vital aspect of its marketing strategy. In that they enable a purchaser 
– commercial or private - to make informed choices about their goods and services 
providers, these responses and any subsequent use that is made of the information 
to promote a company, should be considered a form of commercial expression46 and 
protected as such under s.2(b) of the Canadian Charter. Indeed, a company’s 
                                            
44Règlement 58-101 sur l’information concernant les pratiques en matière de gouvernance, 
http://www.lautorite.qc.ca/files/pdf/reglementation/valeurs-mobilieres/58-101/2015-11-17/2015nov17-
58-101-vofficielle-fr.pdf 
45 Ibid. 
46 In the same way that the Canadian Charter does not explicitly protect a right to privacy per se but allows it to be 
read into sections 7 and 8, it does not explicitly protect the right to “commercial expression”. Rather commercial 
expression is a form of expression that qualifies for protection under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter. In fact, 
since 1988 and the case of Ford v. Quebec ([1988] 2. S.C.R. 712 (“Ford”)), commercial expression generally, 
and advertising in particular, have been considered a form of expression worthy of Canadian Charter protection. 
Hogg justifies this by citing the facts that commercial expression “does literally fall within the meaning of the word 
‘expression’” and that it contributes “to the ‘marketplace of ideas’ that is fostered by the constitutional guarantee” 
and that “it is very difficult to distinguish commercial speech from other kinds of speech, in that a variety of 
political, economic and social ideas are inevitably inherent in commercial speech”,(Hogg, Peter, Constitutional 
Law of Canada, 5th ed., vol 2 Toronto: Carswell, 2014 at 43-22). In Ford the Supreme Court clearly finds that:  
“there is no sound basis on which commercial expression can be excluded from the protection 
of s. 2(b) of the Charter. It is worth noting that the courts below applied a similar generous and 
broad interpretation to include commercial expression within the protection of freedom of 
expression contained in s. 3 of the Quebec Charter. Over and above its intrinsic value as 
expression, commercial expression which, as has been pointed out, protects listeners as well as 
speakers plays a significant role in enabling individuals to make informed economic choices, an 
important aspect of individual self-fulfillment and personal autonomy.” (at 767)  
Arguably, the value of this for form of expression is all the more important almost thirty years after the Ford 
decision was rendered with the rise of consumer, and in response, industry activism. 
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collection, use, and communication of its workforce demographics represents an 
essential feature of its advertising campaign as it informs consumers about important 
characteristics of a product.  
As the law presently stands, however, goods and services providers in Quebec are 
often prevented from effectively responding to an Industry Challenge. They must seek 
“work arounds” in which diversity numbers are presented as a collated percentage 
rather than detailed figures regarding the number of employees belonging to a 
particular category. This may or may not satisfy the client that launched the Industry 
Challenge. It also makes Quebec companies’ commitment to diversity appear weak 
when compared to that of their American competitors. It certainly places Quebec 
companies at a disadvantage in the eyes of clients that truly value diversity and use it 
as a ground on which to base their decision to purchase. Many calls for tenders 
frequently contain statements allowing companies to privilege suppliers with strong 
and explicit diversity policies, initiatives and results. 
Clearly then, PPIPS, PIPEDA, and the FIPs on which they are based, may not be 
adapted to changes in market trends and the value some societies now place on 
diversity and inclusion. A rigid application of these laws that fails to provide industry 
with the appropriate leeway to adapt to new market realities may, in fact, leave both 
laws open to judicial review as was the case in U.F.C.W..  
**** 
Returning to Halpérin’s image of privacy as a shifting border, this essay seeks to 
establish how the border might be drawn between a company’s right to use workforce 
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demographics to market itself and the right of the individual who works for the 
company to keep the same information private. It focuses on three themes in 
particular: the way privacy is perceived and protected in Canada with an emphasis on 
Quebec; the impediments PPIPS and PIPEDA pose to Industry Challenges; and the 
possible amendments, as well as judicial challenges that could be made to existing 
privacy legislation to enable companies to participate in Industry Challenges.  
In addition to this Introduction and to a Conclusion, the pages that follow are divided 
into four chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the ways privacy has been protected in 
jurisdictions with the greatest influence on Canada and Quebec: the European Union, 
the United States and the United Kingdom. Whereas the United States and Europe 
explicitly recognise privacy as a right, they differ on the nature of this right. Europe 
perceives it as a human right. The United States views it more as a property right. In 
contrast, the United Kingdom and other Common Law jurisdictions protect privacy but 
have had difficulty explicitly recognising it as a right. These mixed influences are 
reflected in the Canadian approach to privacy (Chapter 3) where certain laws 
explicitly protect the use, collection, and communication of Personal Information 
thereby preventing a company from effectively and efficiently responding to an 
Industry Challenged, but where the courts, like their counterparts in the United 
Kingdom, are more likely to address privacy on a case by case basis, establishing 
what is reasonable under the circumstances. The last two chapters explore the 
interpretive and legislative amendments that could be made to PPIPS and PEPIDA to 
enable a company to respond to Industry Challenges. Chapter 4 argues that a 
purposive interpretation should be applied to the definition of Personal Information so 
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as to exclude: i) data made publicly available by the individual, ii) employee data 
necessary for the operation of an enterprise, and iii) data required by programs 
intended to remedy social inequalities. Chapter 5 explores the possible legal action a 
company could take on the ground that this legislation violates its right to express 
itself commercially under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter. While PPIPS’ and 
PIPEDA’s objectives may still seem worthy and the legislation rationally connected to 
these, the impairment PIPEDA inflicts on a company is more than minimal. 
Additionally, in that both laws limit a form of commercial expression, and therefore 
risk depriving consumers of information necessary to make informed decisions, 
threaten the competitiveness of Quebec businesses, and discourage private sector 
participation in affirmative action type programs, their overall impediment, in the case 
of an Industry Challenge, outweighs their benefit. 
 
 
Chapter 2. Conflicting Origins: 
 
The Legal Influences on Canadian Privacy Protection 
As discussed in the Introduction, a marked absence of consensus reigns over the 
definition of privacy, not to mention whether it constitutes a right and if so, what type 
of right. The question becomes even more complicated in a country like Canada 
where two major private law regimes, the Common Law and the Civil Law, often 
merge to create hybrid, yet distinctly Canadian, solutions to legal problems. James 
Whitman, in “The Two Western Cultures of Privacy”, describes the challenge in 
defining privacy in a given society as one that first requires identifying “the 
fundamental values that are at stake in the “privacy” question as it is understood in a 
given society”.1 The task, he explains, “is not to realize the true universal values of 
“privacy” in every society. The law puts more limits on us than that: The law will not 
work as law unless it seems to people to embody the basic commitments of their 
society”.2 In other words, the definition and protection of privacy in a given society is a 
reflection of that society’s norms and values. Whitman goes on to observe: “[h]uman 
communities can be founded on the widest variety of norms. As for law: it is not about 
the worldly realizations of wisdom or sophistication as such. Law is about what works, 
what seems appealing and appropriate in a given society”.3 
Since the purpose of this essay is to explore the challenges the use of workforce 
demographics poses to Quebec private sector privacy legislation, this chapter begins 
                                            
1 (2003-2004) 113 Yale L.J. 1151 at 1220. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. at 1168. 
19 
 
by trying to understand the norms and values that have influenced and shaped 
Canada’s approach to privacy. To do so it presents an overview and comparison of 
the privacy norms and legislation present in continental Europe – exemplified by 
France and Germany4 -, the United States and the United Kingdom notably as they 
concern cases involving the workplace as well as competing rights such as freedom 
of expression. This comparison rapidly reveals three starkly different approaches. 
While Europe and the United States diverge on the type of right – human or property 
– privacy represents, they protect it explicitly. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, 
until recently, has adopted a custom-based interpretation of the right to privacy.   
2.1 Privacy Protection in Continental Europe 
2.1.1 Philosophical Origins 
Continental Europe tends to perceive privacy as a human right. Its explicit and 
extensive protection by France and Germany, reflects the primordial importance 
Europeans attribute to dignity and honor and the resulting desire to protect these from 
“loose talk” and the “grubbiness of the world of buying and selling” or, in American 
terms, from freedom of the press and the market economy.5 Although France and 
Germany both tend to protect the right to privacy more comprehensively than the 
United Kingdom or the United States, their reasons for doing so are quite different.  
                                            
4 As a review of each European member state’s norms is too extensive and falls outside the scope of this paper, 
the following paragraphs discuss only those of France and Germany, archetypal civil law regimes the influence 
of which has generally marked the Continental approach and that, while resulting in similar protection, emerged 
from quite different histories. 
5 Supra note 1 at 1171. 
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2.1.1.1 France 
According to Whitman, in France, the modern concern with privacy dates back to the 
French Revolution and the ideal of extending to all citizens the respect for private life 
that up until that point had only been enjoyed by the elite. The 1791 Constitution, 
therefore, included protection against calumnies and insults relative to private life.6 
The practical application of this provision was shaped by a number of cases, not the 
least of which was the trial involving Dumas, Père, who had been photographed with 
a mistress by a photographer who subsequently registered the copyright to the 
photographs with the intention of selling them to the press.7 Dumas sued the 
photographer and the court held that while Dumas did not have a property right in the 
photographs, he had a countervailing right to privacy which enabled him, even after 
having given tacit consent to the publication, to retract this consent.8 Whitman 
explains that “French privacy law was thus the product of the culture of the Paris art 
world, with its nude models, defiant immoralism, and large artistic egos. The cases 
that grew out of that world generally concluded that there was a right to one’s image 
that was distinct from, and in tension with, rights of property”.9 
A more contemporary illustration of privacy protection in France, this time in an 
employment context, is the Nikon case.10 In Nikon, the Cour de cassation overturned 
a court of appeal ruling allowing evidence, obtained by monitoring an employee 
without his knowledge, to be admitted to prove that the employee was transmitting 
                                            
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. at 1176. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. at 1178. 
10 Cass. Soc., 2 octobre 2001, Société Nikon France SA, Bull.Civ. 2001, (“Nikon”). 
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confidential information to a competitor despite having signed a confidentiality 
agreement.11 The Cour de cassation held instead that the employer had violated the 
employee’s right to privacy.12 It reasoned that: 
“[a]ttendu que le salarié a droit, même au temps et au lieu de travail, 
au respect de l’intimité de sa vie privée; que celle-ci implique en 
particulier le secret des correspondances; que l’employeur ne peut 
dès lors sans violation de cette liberté fondamentale prendre 
connaissance des messages personnels émis par le salarié et reçus 
par lui grâce à un outil informatique mis à sa disposition pour son 
travail et ceci même au cas où l’employeur aurait interdit une 
utilisation non professionnelle de l’ordinateur. ”13 
The Nikon decision, especially as it concerns an employment relationship, may seem 
extreme to a North American. It is, however, frequently touted as representative of the 
French approach to privacy.14   
2.1.1.2 Germany 
In Germany, while privacy rights evolved in reaction to some of the same concerns as 
in France, such as freedom of the press and the excesses of market economy, they 
were rooted in different preoccupations and history. According to Whitman, these 
rights developed from the German concept of personality. Unlike in the United States, 
where the opposite of freedom was tyranny, notably from the state, in Germany, the 
opposite of freedom was determinism.15 Consequently, freedom represented the right 
to self-realisation and to develop one’s personality - not the right to engage in 
                                            
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid. 
14 See for example Karen Eltis, “La surveillance du courrier électronique en milieu de travail : le Québec 
succombera-t-il à l’influence de l’approche américaine? ”, (2006) 51 McGill L.J. 475 at 497. 
15 Supra note 1 at 1181. 
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unregulated market transactions.16 The paradigm of the free actor in German society 
was the artist, not the consumer.17 Despite much writing on the subject, however, 
Germany waited until 1949 to recognise the right of personality in its Civil Code - as 
the 1900 version did not include this right,18 and the Nazi code, that endorsed a 
universal German right to the protection of personality, never came into effect.19 The 
horrors of World War II further intensified the value that Germany placed on privacy 
and dignity. It is against this backdrop that comprehensive privacy legislation 
emerged in Europe. 
2.1.2 Legislative Protection 
European legislation tends to protect privacy as a human right that, while not 
absolute, receives prior protection to many other rights. Article 7 of the European 
Union Charter of Fundamental Rights states that “[e]veryone has the right to respect 
for his or her private and family life” and article 8 provides for “the protection of 
personal data”.20 The Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data21 as well as Directive 95/46/EC 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and of 
the free movement of such data provide supranational privacy protection 22.23 
                                            
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. at 1186. 
19 Ibid. at 1187-8. 
20 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm, (“EUCR”). 
21 http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm, (“Convention”). 
22 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf, (“Directive”). 
23 Directive 97/66/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
telecommunications sector (http://www.aip-bg.org/lichnidanni/pdf/directive_97_66.pdf) also protects data in the 
specific field of telecommunication. As this field is not the topic of this paper, this directive will not be discussed. 
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Although Daniel Newman’s observation that “[m]uch like the EU Charter itself, a 
European Union member state’s laws can protect privacy but still be unclear as to 
whether privacy is a fundamental human right”,24 both the Convention and the 
Directive repeatedly refer to privacy as a “fundamental right and freedom”.25 While the 
Directive also acknowledges the economic value of data and its importance to the 
internal European market,26 it in no way attempts to balance, as does some Canadian 
legislation discussed in the next chapter,27 competing commercial and individual 
rights.  
Since the Directive, that ensures uniform privacy protection throughout European 
member states, contains the provisions that are of greatest interest to this study, a 
closer examination of this legislation is in order. As with the legislation applicable to 
the private sector in Quebec, it reflects a consent-based approach to the protection of 
personal information. It is founded on the OECD Principles,28 the implementation of 
which was mandatory as of October 28 1998. The Directive thus applies to the 
processing29 of personal data30 by member states. Accordingly, data must be: 
                                            
24 Newman, Daniel E., “European Union and United States Personal Information Privacy, and Human Rights 
Philosophy – Is There a Match?”, (2008) 22 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 307, at 329. 
25 Ibid. at 329. 
26 Supra note 22 Preamble (8). 
27 See for example the purpose of the federal Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 
2000, c. 5 (“PIPEDA”) that seeks to balance the privacy right of an individual with the need of an organization to 
collect, use and disclose personal information. A similar purpose marks the provincial privacy legislation in 
British Columbia and Alberta.  See for example s. 2 of the British Columbia Personal Information Protection Act, 
SBC 2003 Chapter 23 or s. 3 of the Alberta Personal Information Protection Act, S.A. Chapter P-6-5. 
28 These are: collection limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security, openness, individual 
participation, and data accountability. 
29 Supra note 22, art. 2(b) defines processing as “any operation or set of operations which is performed upon 
personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.”  
30 Ibid. art. 2(a) defines personal data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
(‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference 
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processed fairly and lawfully; collected and used for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes; be adequate, relevant and not excessive, in relation to the purpose for 
which they are collected; as well as accurate and maintained up to date.31 Subjects 
must be allowed to access their data and to rectify, erase, and block incorrect data.32 
Member states are required to create supervisory bodies that are to be notified when 
controllers are processing data,33 and are prevented from transferring data to third 
countries which do not offer adequate protection.34  
Although the Directive makes the data-subject’s unambiguous consent a precondition 
to any processing, certain exceptions exists. For example, consent is not required for 
the performance of a contract to which the data-subject is party, or the protection of 
the data-subject’s vital interest.35 Likewise, art. 3 exempts the processing by natural 
persons of data in the course of “purely personal or household activities” as well as 
processing in the course of activity that falls outside the scope of Community law 
such as public security, defence and state security.36 Interestingly, the Directive also 
allows member states to derogate from the scope of the law if the processing is 
carried out for journalistic, literary or artistic purposes but only if the derogation is 
necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules of freedom of expression.37 
                                                                                                                                         
to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity”.  
31 Ibid. at art. 6. 
32 Ibid. at art. 12. 
33 Ibid. at art. 28. 
34 Ibid. at art. 25. 
35 Ibid. at art.7.  
36 Ibid. at art. 3(2). 
37 Ibid. at art. 9. 
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Two provisions of particular interest for this essay are those pertaining to marketing 
and to the collection of special categories of data. With respect to the former, art. 14 
(b) grants the data subject the right to object to having personal data processed for 
the purposes of direct marketing, or to be informed before personal data is disclosed 
for the first time to a third party or used on their behalf for the purposes of direct 
marketing, and to be given the right to object free of charge to such disclosure and 
uses. 38 This “opt-out” approach would appear more permissive than the legislation in 
effect in Quebec that requires the subject’s consent to the processing and disclosure 
of personal information.  
With respect to special categories of data, art. 8 requires member states to prohibit 
the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and processing of data 
concerning health or sex life unless the subject has explicitly consented.39 Certain 
exceptions to this article exist including: a) where the subject has given their explicit 
consent; b) where processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the 
obligations and specific rights of the controller in the field of employment law; (c) 
where the processing is necessary to protect the vital interest of the data-subject or 
another person and the data-subject is unable to provide consent; (d) where the 
processing is carried out in the course of a foundation’s, association’s or other non-
for-profit-seeking body’s legitimate activities with a political, philosophical religious or 
trade union aim or; e) where the processing relates to data which are manifestly 
                                            
38 Ibid. at art. 14 (b) 
39 Ibid. at art. 8. 
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made public by the data subject or is necessary for the establishment, exercise or 
defence of legal claims.40 The seemingly comprehensive privacy protection of the 
Directive stands in sharp contrast to that of other geographies, notably the United 
States.  
2.2 Privacy Protection in the United States 
Unlike many Common Law countries, the Unites States has a comparatively long 
tradition of recognizing privacy as a right in and of itself and of protecting it against 
violation from both public and private bodies. Its approach, however, is quite different 
from that of continental Europe. For instance, the United States provides strong 
protection against interference by public bodies but only sectorial legislation 
regulating the behaviour of private parties in sectors where information is deemed 
particularly sensitive. Companies operating outside these specific sectors are at 
liberty to develop their own privacy regulations and the Federal Trade Commission, 
the mandate of which is to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive business 
practices, is left to enforce these.41  
2.2.1 Philosophical Origins 
The American approach to privacy protection, much like the European approach, 
reflects the norms and values that shape its society. Instead of viewing privacy as an 
intrinsic part of an individual’s honour and personality, the United States tends to treat 
it as a commodity governed by the rules of contract law. This perception is set out in 
the HEW Report which became the blueprint for the Federal Privacy Act of 1974 and 
                                            
40 Ibid. at arts. 8 (1) and (2).  
41 Supra note 24 at 336. 
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that treats information as a good that can be traded against other goods and 
services.42 The Report, however, suggests that consent should be obtained from an 
individual whose information has been collected for a particular purpose before that 
information can be used for another purpose.43  
As information is generally treated as a form of property in the United States, its 
greatest threat is perceived to come from government. This fear is reflected in the 
robust legislation protecting individuals from invasion of privacy by government but 
minimal legislation when it comes to regulating how private parties deal with each 
other’s information.  
A second feature distinguishing American from European privacy protection is the 
secondary place it takes to freedom of expression – notably the press – in the 
hierarchy of rights.  Whereas, as described by Whitman, French and German-case 
law betrays suspicion of the press, and art. 9 of the Directive does not make an 
absolute exception for journalistic purposes but only allows these if it is necessary to 
reconcile privacy rights with members states’ rules governing freedom of expression, 
in the United States freedom of expression and of the press are seemingly 
sacrosanct. Although certain American writers, such as Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis, arguing for a French approach to privacy protection, criticised the press for 
“overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency”,44 
their vision, by in large, has not prevailed in the United States. In fact, Whitman 
                                            
42 Ibid., at 337. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Warren, Samuel D. and Brandeis, Louis D., “The Right to Privacy”, Harvard Law Review, V.IV, No.5, December 
1890. 
28 
 
observes: “[f]reedom of expression has been the most deadly enemy of continental 
style privacy in America”.45 The American understanding of privacy, therefore, 
renders its protection less comprehensive than in Europe. This nuance is particularly 
striking, as the next paragraphs discuss, when applied to the context of the 
workplace.  
2.2.2 Legal Protection 
2.2.2.1 Statutory 
According to Charles Morgan, two federal laws protect an individual’s privacy right in 
the United States. While the United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment protects 
against unreasonable search and seizure by government officials or by federal or 
state employers, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) Title 1 § 2511 
prevents parties from “intentionally intercept[ing], endeavor[ing] to intercept, or 
procur[ing] any other person to intercept or to endeavor to intercept any … electronic 
communication” and from disclosing such information.46 Morgan explains, however, 
that the protection this statute offers in the workplace is limited by its exceptions 
notably by § 2511(2)(d) that provides that such interception is not illegal if consent 
has been obtained, and by § 2511 (2)(a)(i) that creates a “business use exception” for 
any officer, employee or agent of wire or electronic wire or electronic communication 
services who “intercept[s], disclose[s], or use[s] that communication in the normal 
course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is necessarily incident 
to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property of the 
                                            
45 Supra note 1 at 1209. 
46 Morgan, Charles, “Employer Monitoring of Employee Electronic Mail and Internet Use”, (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 
849 at 866-7.  
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provider of that service”.47 The exception applies when the employer is deemed to be 
the provider of the services, which is generally the case, and the activity occurs in the 
normal course of employment.48 In addition, once the communication has been 
transmitted it falls outside the scope of Title 1.49 Title 2, that protects against access 
to stored communication, contains an exception for “the person or entity providing the 
wire or electronic communications service” thus enabling the employer to access 
employee email as the employer is usually deemed to be the provider of the 
service.50,51 
In addition to the United States Constitution and to the ECPA, legislation such as the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the 
Federal Videotape Privacy Protection Act recognise and protect sensitive information 
respectively of medical records, financial records, child internet use, credit records 
and videotape.52  
2.2.2.2 Tort 
In addition to legislative protection, and contrary to many Common Law jurisdictions, 
American courts, for a long time, have recognised the tort of invasion of privacy. The 
                                            
47 Ibid. at 867-8. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 It is interesting to note, as does Morgan, that while in Canada, s. 184(1) of the Criminal Code also punishes 
anyone who willfully intercepts a private communication by electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other 
devises and is therefore similar in wording to the ECPA, the protection afforded by the Canadian legislation is 
potentially broader first, because of the prima facie expectation of privacy that exists in Canada around means of 
communications, and second, because the definition of “intercepting” is broader in Canada than in the United 
States. The Criminal Code also makes it a crime to disclose any information that was intercepted illegally. 
52 Supra note 24 at 338. 
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Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts § 652A states that: 
“the right of privacy is invaded by: (a) unreasonable intrusion upon 
the seclusion of another […]; (b) appropriation of the other’s name or 
likeness […]; (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private 
life […]; or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false 
light before the public.”53  
By way of contrast to the Nikon case in France, it would appear that American privacy 
law would not unconditionally protect the privacy of an employee. Morgan explains 
that while the tort of invasion of privacy may be effective in defending against a 
variety of privacy breaches, in the context of the workplace, unless an employer 
discloses the information obtained through monitoring, the only violation for which it 
may be found liable is unreasonable intrusion into seclusion of another.54 To succeed 
in his or her claim, however, the employee must prove that: 1. there was an 
“intrusion”; 2. the intrusion was “highly offensive”; and 3. to a “reasonable person”.55 
While electronic surveillance usually satisfies the first requirement, in order to 
determine if the intrusion is highly offensive, the court will examine “the degree of 
intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion, as well 
as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the 
expectations of those whose privacy is invaded”.56 While the employer can invoke 
express or implied consent as a defence, a good faith belief in consent is 
insufficient.57 Finally, the employee must prove that he or she had a subjective 
expectation of privacy and that this expectation is objectively reasonable – a case 
                                            
53 Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts, § 652A (1997). 
54 Supra note 46 at 689. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
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that, as discussed below, is very difficult to make in a workplace environment in the 
United States.58  
In the United States, therefore, the right of the employer to monitor its employees in 
the workplace, while not absolute, is certainly strong. This is explained by the fact that 
personal information is considered a commodity that the employee exchanges in 
consideration for employment and justified by the fact that the employer owns the 
work tool. Case-law, such as Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co.59 nevertheless suggests 
that the right to monitor is not absolute. In this case, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals 
decided that while an employer had the right to monitor working calls so as to ensure 
quality control – a policy of which the employees were informed – this did not give it 
the right to monitor personal calls.60 Consent to the monitoring of business calls, 
could not, in the court’s mind, be interpreted as general consent to monitor all calls.61  
The above reasoning, however, has not been followed when it comes to monitoring 
email. In Smyth v. Pillsburry Co., in which an employee sued his employer for 
invasion of privacy after the employer breached its own privacy policy, protecting the 
confidentiality of email, by using an unprofessional message sent by the employee to 
his manager to dismiss the employee, the court held that the employee had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy.62 It claimed not to find “a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in e-mail communications voluntarily made by an employee to his 
                                            
58 Ibid. 
59 Carmie Watkins, Plaintiff-appellant, v. L.M. Berry & Company, et al., Defendants-appellees, 704 F.2d 577 (11th 
Cir. 1983).  
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Smyth v. Pillsburry Co., 914. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996), 98 (“Pillsburry”). 
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supervisor over the company e-mail system notwithstanding any assurances that 
such communications would not be intercepted by management” and proceeded to 
stat that: 
“even if we found that an employee had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of his e-mail communications over the 
company e-mail system, we do not find that a reasonable person 
would consider the defendant’s interception of these communications 
to be a substantial or highly offensive invasion of his privacy.[…] 
Moreover, the company’s interest in preventing inappropriate and 
unprofessional comments or even illegal activity over its e-mail 
system outweighs any privacy interest the employee may have in 
those comments.”63  
It is worth noting, as Morgan does, that Pillsbury may be an example of bad facts 
making bad law as the email sent by the employee allegedly contained violent content 
thereby requiring special cause for concern and action on behalf of the employer.64 
Moreover, as discussed below, the United States is somewhat unique among 
Common Law traditions in its explicit and relatively long-standing recognition and 
protection of a privacy right.  
2.3 Privacy Protection in the United Kingdom  
Given Canada’s long-time status as a British colony and its inheritance of similar 
judicial and governmental structures, a discussion of the legal traditions that have 
influenced Canada would be incomplete without an overview of the United Kingdom’s 
approach to privacy protection. At present, the United Kingdom, unlike the United 
States and some Canadian provinces, does not recognise a private right of action for 
breach of privacy. Instead, it seems to have expanded the application of the Common 
                                            
63 Ibid., at 101. 
64 Supra note at 46 at 871. 
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Law tort of breach of confidence to cover damages similar to those suffered for 
breach of privacy in other jurisdictions. It should be noted, however, that Britain does 
provide for the protection of data in the Data Protection Act.65  
In his comparison of the privacy tort in several Common Law jurisdictions, Chris Hunt 
explains the reluctance of these jurisdictions to recognise the tort of invasion of 
privacy by citing: 1. Scope – does invasion of privacy require disclosure of information 
to be actionable as in the United Kingdom and New Zealand or is physical intrusion 
sufficient as in the United States?; 2. Doctrine – is the action grounded in tort law as 
in the United States and New Zealand or a modified version of breach of confidence 
as in the United Kingdom?; and 3 Conflict with other rights – most particularly with 
freedom of expression that the United States seems to privilege while New Zealand 
appears to privilege privacy.66  
The conflict between privacy and freedom of expression is particularly apparent in 
Campbell v. MGN Limited, one of the first cases in the United Kingdom to recognise a 
private right of action for behaviour that amounted to breach of privacy by the 
media.67 It did so by expanding the scope of the tort of breach of confidence. In fact, 
the apparent favouring of freedom of the press over privacy by the British bench has 
led to chastisement by scholars such as Gavin Philipson who note that “the 
                                            
65 1998 c. 29. 
66 “Conceptualizing Privacy and Elucidating its Importance: Foundational Considerations for the Development of 
Canada’s Fledgling Privacy Tort”, (2011) 37:1 Queen’s L.J. 167 at 169-171.   
67 Declaring that “[t]he time has come to recognise that the values enshrined in articles 8 and 10 are now part of 
the cause of action for breach of confidence” and that “ [t]he values embodied in articles 8 and 10 are as much 
applicable in disputes between individuals or between an individual and a non-governmental body”, the House of 
Lords expanded the reach of the tort of breach of confidence to cover instances in which an individual’s privacy 
has been violated – especially in the media, [2004] UKHL at para 17 (“Campbell”). 
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predominant approach of the courts fails structurally to afford privacy the respect it 
deserves as a Convention right, while remaining uncritically receptive to the claims of 
what, in many cases, amounts to markedly ‘low value’ expression”.68 As the law 
presently stands in the United Kingdom, it would appear that the tort of breach of 
confidence has been expanded to cover invasion of privacy between private parties. It 
should also be recalled that as a European Union member state, the United Kingdom 
is subject to the same supra-national legislation as France and Germany.69  
Irrespective of the fact that the United Kingdom would appear to lag behind many 
jurisdictions on explicitly recognising a tort of invasion of privacy, the role that custom 
plays in the court’s interpretation of the law means that privacy is a principle that has 
served as a backdrop against which many cases have been heard, and as such, is 
very present in the legal culture of the country. Historically, the United Kingdom has 
been opposed to any form of written constitution including a Canadian-style charter of 
rights as the power it places in the hands of the judiciary would interfere with the 
sacrosanct principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Murray Hunt explains that: 
“for Dicey, the British constitution rested on twin foundations: the 
absolute and continuing legal sovereignty of Parliament and a judicial 
commitment to a rule of law ideal which, subject only to Parliament’s 
sovereign will, guaranteed the protection of an individual’s private 
rights of property and analogous freedoms from state interference.”70  
                                            
68 “Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of Privacy under the Human Rights Act”, 
MLR 66:5, September 2003, 726 at 727. 
69 At the time of writing, the United Kingdom had just voted to exit the European Union and the legal ramifications 
of this vote on European legislation to which it was subject are not yet clear.  
70 Using Human Rights Law in English Courts, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1997 at 3.  
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Traces of this thinking can be found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
that while binding on Parliament, includes s. 33 enabling a legislature to declare an 
act of Parliament or of the legislature to operate notwithstanding a provision in 
sections 2 or 5 to 7 of the Canadian Charter.71 
The absence of a written constitution or charter of rights does not mean that the 
United Kingdom does not recognise or protect rights. In fact, the effect of a non-
written constitution on the protection of privacy is well explained in several post-1998 
Bill of Rights cases in which the House of Lords grapples with the paradigm shift 
required to interpret and implement an explicit protection of rights – and most notably 
the EUCR that was introduced into British law through the 1998 Bill. The challenge 
seems not to have been so much the concept of privacy itself as expressed in art. 8 
of the EUCR, but that in the court’s mind a tort of invasion of privacy was not 
necessary to remedy a breach of art. 8. This appears vividly in the 2003 House of 
Lord’s decision in Wainwright v. Home Office in which Lord Hoffman clearly rejects 
the tort of invasion of privacy in English law.72 He explains that “[t]here seems to me a 
great difference between identifying privacy as a value which underlies the existence 
of a rule of law (and may point the direction in which the law should develop) and 
privacy as a principle of law in itself”73. This does not mean that a protection of 
privacy does not exist in the United Kingdom but rather that it forms one of the 
customs against which law is interpreted. This subtlety is explained in Campbell by 
Lord Hoffman who states: “[t]his House decided in Wainright v. Home Office that 
                                            
71 Constitution Act, 1982  R.S.C., 1985, App.II, no 44 (the “Canadian Charter”). 
72 [2003] UKHL 53. 
73 Ibid. at para 31.  
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there is no general tort of invasion of privacy. But the right to privacy is in a general 
sense one of the values, and sometimes the most important value, which underlies a 
number of more specific causes of action, both at common law and under various 
statutes”.74  The reluctance to define a specific right to privacy but to use the value as 
a norm against which to interpret various cases has arguably marked the Canadian 
judiciary. 
**** 
The above comparison of privacy protection in continental Europe, the United States, 
and the United Kingdom explains the varying influences upon Canada’s approach to 
privacy as discussed in the next chapter. The comparison also raises the question of 
whether, in the context of the workplace, privacy should even be considered a “right”, 
be it the human right essential to the employee’s dignity that the employee holds 
against the world or a property right that the employee barters as consideration for 
employment. Pushed to the extreme, these positions and their application to the 
workplace, lead to decisions, such as Nikon or Pillsburry, that strike one as 
fundamentally unfair. Just as in Nikon an employer should have some mechanism to 
protect confidential information – even if this means monitoring those who have 
access to it in some form or other – in Pillsburry, an employee working for a company, 
the policy of which is to respect the confidentiality of the employee’s correspondence, 
should have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Perhaps the seeming injustice of 
both these decisions flows from a failure to view the workplace as a space where a 
                                            
74 Supra note 67 at para 43. 
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number of rights and obligations interact lending credence to the distinction Lord 
Hoffman draws between privacy as an interpretive principle rather than a right in and 
of itself. The extremes reflected in both Nikon and Pillsburry stand in sharp contrast to 
the more tempered Canadian approach.  
 
 
Chapter 3. Being Reasonable: 
 
The Canadian Approach to Privacy Protection and the Impediments it 
Poses to Industry Challenge 
The evolution of Canada’s and Quebec’s privacy regimes betrays the blend of 
influences discussed in the previous chapter. Up until 2001, the country’s approach to 
privacy protection, at the federal level at least, resembled that of the United States in 
that it was mostly regulated on a sectorial basis through legislation such as the Radio 
Communications Act,1 the Telecommunications Act,2 the Bank Act3 and the Canada 
Post Act4. At a provincial level, it was also protected by sector-specific legislation and 
statutory tort provisions. Over the course of four years, between 2000 and 2004, and 
in response to commercial pressures from the European Union, the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act came into effect, providing 
comprehensive private sector privacy protection in provinces that did not have their 
own legislation and across the country for organizations that handle information in 
connection with the operation of a federal work, undertaking or business or that 
conduct interprovincial or international trade activities.5 It was followed shortly after by 
similar provincial laws in Alberta6 and British Columbia.7 In Quebec, an individual’s 
personal information had been protected, since 1993, by An Act Respecting the 
                                            
1 R.S.C., 1985, c.R-2. 
2 S.C. 1993, c.38. 
3 S.C. 1991, c.46. 
4 R.S.C., 1985, c.C-10. 
5 S.C. 2000, c. 5 (“PIPEDA”). 
6 Personal Information Protection Act, S.A. 2003, Chapter P-6.5 (“Alberta PIPA”). 
7 Personal Information Protection Act, S.B.C. 2003, Chapter 63 (“BC PIPA”).  
39 
 
Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector,8 but as of 2004, if that 
individual transacted with a federal work or undertaking or with an organization, this 
information could also be protected by PIPEDA. 
At the same time these laws were being tabled, debated, and enacted, Canadian 
Courts were also active in defining privacy only in a pondered way reminiscent of the 
United Kingdom’s bench. An important body of case law, then, was beginning to 
emerge largely in connection with section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms that protects against unreasonable search and seizure, and to a lesser 
extent, section 7 that provides for “the right to life, liberty and security of the person 
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice”.9 The analysis adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada 
(“Supreme Court”) to interpret these provisions is neither a purely Civil Law nor a 
purely Common Law approach but consists in establishing whether an expectation of 
privacy exists, if so whether it was violated, and in the affirmative, whether this 
violation is justifiable given the context in which it occurred. At present, therefore, 
privacy protection in Canada reflects a tension between an explicit legislative 
recognition and protection of this right, as in Continental Europe and the United 
States, and a more normative interpretation of this right by the courts that, as in the 
United Kingdom, appear reluctant to define and defend it in absolute terms.  
So as to understand the balance that might be struck between an organization’s right 
to use workforce demographics to market itself and Quebec’s private sector privacy 
                                            
8 Chapter P-39.1 (“PPIPS”). 
9 Constitution Act, 1982 R.S.C., 1985, App.II, no 44 (“Canadian Charter”). 
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legislation, the pages that follow will review the Canadian courts’ analysis of privacy, 
first in search and seizure instances and then in cases between private parties, 
notably involving the workplace, before focussing specifically on the provisions of 
PPIPS and PIPEDA that most hinder an organization’s response to an Industry 
Challenge (as defined in Chapter 1). The two impressions that stand out from such an 
analysis are first, the court’s refusal to interpret privacy as an absolute right but rather 
as an interest to be weighed against competing interests, and second, the 
legislation’s embodiment of values that have since evolved and may require adapting 
to a new reality.  
3.1 Privacy Before the Courts 
3.1.1 Search and Seizure Provisions Interpreted 
Although it would be inaccurate to claim that the Supreme Court has followed the 
House of Lords in defining the content of a right to privacy – especially since the 
reverse appears to be the case10 – its analytical approach to this right, to a certain 
extent, reflects the custom-based reasoning of the Law Lords.  For example, while the 
Supreme Court has defined privacy as “a biographical core of personal information 
which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control 
from dissemination to the state”11, it has never enumerated specifically what this 
information might be. Instead, it has developed the notion of “interests”, linked to 
individuals not to places, which must be attributed particular care by law enforcement 
                                            
10 See for example Campbell v. MGN Limited, [2004] UKHL, in which Lord Nicholls cites R. v. Dyment [1988] 2 
S.C.R. 417 (“Dyment”) and Lord Hope cites Aubry v. Les Editions Vice-Versa Inc. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 591 
(“Aubry”), at paras. 12 and 120. 
11 R. v. Plant [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 at 293. 
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officials who seek access to them. Two often intertwined inquiries mark the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of what constitutes a protected interest. The first consists in 
establishing whether a person has a privacy interest in the matter before the court. To 
do so, a second step is required, that of determining whether the type of privacy 
violation alleged by the individual corresponds to one of the three types of interests 
that are worthy of protection  
3.1.1.1 Striking a Balance 
The Supreme Court weighs four elements to establish the existence of a privacy 
interest: 1. the subject matter of the alleged search; 2. the claimant’s interest in the 
subject matter; 3. the claimant’s subjective expectation of privacy in the subject 
matter; and 4. whether the subjective expectation is objectively reasonable given the 
totality of circumstances.12 This analysis has led the Supreme Court to conclude that, 
for example, an individual does not have a privacy interest in energy patterns 
emanating from his home.13 It also led to the ruling that the use of a computer 
belonging to a school board that has set policies regarding its use lowered but did not 
abolish the user’s expectation of privacy.14 Likewise, it held that the statutory and 
contractual framework governing an internet service provider’s disclosure of 
subscriber information contributed to but were not determinative of a subscriber’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.15  
                                            
12 R. v. Spencer  2014 S.C.C. 43 (CanLII) at para. 18 (“Spencer”). 
13 R. v. Tessling [2004] 3 S.C.R. 431 at 451 (“Tessling”).  
14 R. v. Cole, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34 at 51.  
15 Supra note 12, at para. 54.  
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3.1.1.2 Protected Interests 
The second characteristic of the Supreme Court’s analysis of a “privacy interest” is 
the notion of the interest protected. These limited numbers of interests are deemed to 
be more private than others and consequently meriting greater caution when 
attempting to gain access to the information they harbour. In Dyment, the Supreme 
Court identifies three, frequently overlapping, interests that are worthy of protection: 
personal, territorial, and informational.16   
Personal privacy interests include mostly interests attached to an individual’s physical 
being. Traditionally, this interest has been perceived as giving rise to the most serious 
violations of an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  
Territorial or spatial interests, including most particularly the home, have also been 
deemed worthy of vigilant protection. Certain examples of what could be included in a 
territorial or spacial privacy interest are, in an order of diluted expectation: the 
perimeter space around the home, commercial space, a private car, a school, and at 
the bottom of the spectrum, a prison.17  
The third interest recognised by the court is an informational privacy interest. It often 
overlaps with other interests as a result, notably, of computers and portable 
telecommunication devices. This right includes the right to store and control 
information and possibly the right to anonymity.  
                                            
16 Supra note 10 at 428. 
17 Supra note 13 at 444. 
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An argument could be made that the Supreme Court is moving in the direction of 
recognising a fourth privacy interest: informational privacy. In recent decisions it 
seems to suggest that, as a result of the nature and quantity of information they 
contain, computers and portable phones cannot be considered an extension of the 
person or place being searched but require special considerations. In R. v. Vu, the 
Supreme Court decided that given the access they provide to information about an 
individual, computers were not to be treated as a cupboard or filing cabinet.18 It 
underlined the fact that computers: 1. store immense amounts of information some of 
which will touch the biographical core of personal information; 2. contain information 
that is automatically generated often unbeknownst to the user; 3. retain files and 
dates even after the user thinks they have deleted these; and 4. provide law 
enforcement agents, in the case of a computer linked to the internet, with access to 
other devices, documents, and information that are not in any meaningful sense at 
the location for which the search is authorised.19 The exception accorded to 
computers was extended to mobile phones in R. v. Fearon.20 Ironically, it often seems 
that it is within this informational sphere that individuals appear to behave with the 
greatest insouciance with respect to their personal information.  
3.1.1.3 Abandonment  
A particularly interesting feature of the Supreme Court’s analysis is the notion that 
                                            
18 [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657 at 663. 
19 Ibid., at 676. 
20 The minority decision in this case is particularly interesting as it suggests that technology may have a closer 
connection to the individual’s privacy interest than their physical being. Justice Karakatsanis writes that “the 
incredible and unique power of modern digital communication devices as portals to vast stores of information – 
and their ability to expose our private lives – means that they can be even more threatening to our privacy than 
the search of our homes”,  [2014] S.C.R. 77 (CanLII) at para 134 (“Fearon”).  
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privacy is not absolute but can be abandoned if an individual deliberately behaves in 
such a way as to lead a reasonable person to assume that they have forgone a right 
to privacy. In Tessling, Justice Binnie states that “a person can have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in what he or she knowingly exposes to the public, or to a 
section of the public, or abandons in a public place”.21 In R. v. Patrick, he adds that 
“[a]bandonment is therefore an issue of fact. The question is whether the claimant 
has acted in relation to the subject matter of his privacy claim in such a manner as to 
lead a reasonable and independent observer to conclude that his continued assertion 
of a privacy interest is unreasonable in the totality of the circumstances”.22 Privacy is 
not an absolute right but a question of what is reasonable under the circumstances.  
3.1.2 Interpreting Privacy Breaches by Private Parties 
As with the enforcement of a privacy right in search and seizure cases, protecting the 
individual’s right to privacy against a breach by another private party requires first, 
establishing whether such a right existed and was violated illicitly, and second, 
whether other considerations might justify the violation. This approach has marked 
cases dealing notably with the conflict between privacy and freedom of the press 
such as Aubry23 and A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc24. The paragraphs that follow, 
however, discuss the right to privacy in the context of a workplace where employers’ 
and employees’ interest are often at odds as they might be in cases involving Industry 
Challenges. 
                                            
21 Supra note 13, at 451. 
22 [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579 at 596. 
23 Supra note 10. 
24 [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567. 
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3.1.2.1 Workplace Surveillance  
Similar to the analysis developed in Canadian Charter cases, jurisprudence on 
workplace surveillance reveals neither a purely Common Law nor a purely Civil Law 
understanding of a right to privacy in the workplace but rather decisions based upon 
what is reasonable once all the interests have been weighed. This is hardly surprising 
since the law provides for what sometimes can appear to be competing obligations on 
employers and employees. For example, art. 2085 of the Civil Code of Quebec gives 
the employer the right to direct and control the employee,25 but in turn the employer 
must “take any measures consistent with the nature of the work to protect the health, 
safety and dignity of the employee”.26 The employee is bound “to act faithfully and 
honestly and not to use any confidential information he obtains in the performance or 
in the course of his work”.27 While an employee may have a right to privacy, it is 
difficult to conceive how an employer can ensure that it is meeting all its obligations 
without the ability to monitor its employees.  
In an employment context arbitration panels and courts seem to balance a perceived 
right against other considerations. For example, according to Michael Geist, in 
Doman Forest Products Ltd the court applied R. v. Duarte28 to the employer-
employee context to conclude that a right to privacy was not absolute but must be 
judged against what was reasonable under the circumstances which in turn depended 
                                            
25 S.Q. 1991, c.64 (“CCQ”). 
26 Ibid. at art. 2087. 
27 Ibid. at art. 2088. 
28 [1990] 1 SCR 30. 
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upon the competing interests of the parties.29 In determining reasonableness the 
arbitrator pointed to: a). whether it was reasonable to request the surveillance; b) 
whether surveillance was conducted in a reasonable manner; c) whether there were 
similar alternatives to surveillance opened to the employer.30  
Likewise, the Quebec Court of Appeal’s controversial decision in Syndicat des 
travailleurs(euses) de Bridgestone Firestone de Joliette (csn) c. Trudeau31, fifteen 
years ago, but still valid today, seems to have consolidated this weighing of interests. 
The case addresses an employer’s use of videotaped images of an employee on 
disability leave gardening, collecting his son from daycare, and going about his 
business in town, to prove that the employee was, in fact, not as disabled as he had 
claimed.32 In rendering his decision, Justice LeBel confirmed the Superior Court’s 
finding that while an employer’s surveillance of its employee constituted a violation of 
the latter’s right to privacy, this right was not absolute and the surveillance of the 
employee outside his work could be conducted provided: 1. it was justified by rational 
motives; 2. it was conducted by reasonable means; 3. it appeared necessary to 
monitor the behaviour of an employee; and  4. it was conducted in the least intrusive 
manner possible.33 Understandably, the decision has been criticised by authors, such 
as Karen Eltis, for moving Quebec away from a Civil Law understanding of an 
employee’s right to privacy, anchored in the dignity of the employee, to an American 
                                            
29 Geist, Michael, “Computer and E-Mail Workplace Surveillance in Canada: The Shift From Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy To Reasonable Surveillance” (2003) 82 R. du B. can. 1 at 26-7. 
30 Ibid. 
31 1999 CanLII 13295 (QC CA).  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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understanding in which the employee’s right is more akin to a property right.34 Less 
preoccupied with the preservation of legal systems than Eltis, Geist simply 
summarizes the case law on workplace surveillance as “surveillance is permitted, but 
only where a substantial problem has been identified, the surveillance is likely to 
solve the problem, alternative approaches have been unsuccessfully pursued, and 
the surveillance is implemented in a fair, even-handed manner”.35 In other words, it 
must be reasonable! The court’s tendency to balance competing rights is an important 
backdrop against which to read the private sector privacy legislation in effect in 
Quebec as it provides some guidance with respect to the interpretation and 
application of these laws.  
3.2 PPIPS and PIPEDA 
As mentioned briefly in the introduction to this chapter, the two laws that are most 
relevant to understanding the privacy protection applicable to the Quebec private 
sector are PPIPS and PIPEDA. An overview of the context form which they emerged, 
their structure, their purpose, and their provisions that are the most cumbersome to 
an organization’s ability to respond to an Industry Challenge, reveal the areas in 
which interpretive or legislative changes may be required to accommodate present 
market practices.  
3.2.1 Some Context 
According to Eloise Gratton, both PPIPS and PIPEDA reflect the concerns of a third 
                                            
34 Eltis, Karen, “La surveillance du courrier électronique en milieu de travail : le Québec succombera-t-il a 
l’influence de l’approche américaine?”, (2006) 51 McGill L.J. 475. 
35 Supra note 29 at 28. 
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wave of privacy protection when the main threat to privacy was perceived to come 
from electronic data processing and notably the volume of data involved, its storage 
and retrieval techniques, its transmission over long distances as well as the speed at 
which these operations could be performed and the high storage capacities of 
computers.36 To protect against this, privacy came to mean “control over personal 
information” and a series of fair information practice (“FIP”s) were developed37 that 
now form the core of most data protection legislation. These FIPs are reflected in 
PPIPS and PIPEDA that, regardless of their slightly different purposes, which will be 
discussed below and in Chapter 5, define “personal information” narrowly and 
regulate its collection, use, and transfer. Although this restriction does not apply to 
“personal information which by law is public”, in the case of PPIPS38, or “publicly 
available”, in the case of PIPEDA39 (“Public Information”), the type of information 
deemed public is either restrictively defined in a regulation, in the case of PIPEDA40, 
or it must be identified as such in a statute, in the case of PPIPS.  
3.2.2 Structure and Purpose 
Whereas both PPIPS and PIPEDA regulate the same activity, that is to say the 
collection, use, and transmission of personal information, PIPEDA expressly seeks to 
balance the rights of the individual with that of the organization while PPIPS, as it is 
                                            
36 Gratton, Eloise, Understanding Personal Information: Managing Privacy Risks, Markham, ON, Lexis Nexis 
Canada Inc., 2013 at 21. 
37 These FIPs attempt to place the individual in control of their personal information by providing them with the 
right to know the information about them that is being shared, the purpose for which it is collected or 
communicated and how to have incorrect information corrected or erased. Ibid., at 10. 
38 Supra note 8 at s.1. 
39 Supra note 5 at ss. 7(1)(d), 7(2)(c.1), 7(3)(h.1) 
40 Regulations Specifying Publicly Available Information SOR /2001-7. 
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drafted, seeks exclusively to protect the individual’s right not to have his or her 
privacy invaded as set out in articles 35 to 40 of the CCQ. PPIPS clearly states that 
its object is to: 
“establish, for the exercise of the rights conferred by articles 35 to 40 
of the Civil Code concerning the protection of personal information, 
particular rules with respect to the personal information relating to 
other persons which a person collects, holds, uses or communicates 
to third persons in the course of carrying on an enterprise within the 
meaning of article 1525 of the Civil Code.”41  
While it would be tempting to argue that PPIPS focuses exclusively on the protection 
of privacy, and indeed its structure that contains a series of provisions, enforcement 
and oversight mechanisms and clear penalties for the violation of the law would 
suggest as much, it is important to recall that during the parliamentary debates at 
which PPIPS was first introduced the Honourable Laurence Cannon, Minister of 
Communications, emphasized that while “le Quebec était mur pour une loi qui 
protégerait les renseignements personnels détenus dans le secteur privé. […] une 
telle législation ne devait pas freiner la compétitivité des entreprises du Québec”.42 
Seemingly, the legislator did not intend the individual’s right to privacy to be so 
absolute as to interfere with other interests such as those of Quebec businesses.  
In contrast to PPIPS’ apparently singular focus, PIPEDA, as its name and structure 
suggest, seeks to balance many interests. Its purpose as set out in s. 3 is to 
establish: 
                                            
41 Supra note 8 at s. 1. 
42 Commission permanente de la culture, Fascicule no 11, 23 février 1993, p 337 at 338. 
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“rules to govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal 
information in a manner that recognizes the right of privacy of 
individuals with respect to their personal information and the need of 
organizations to collect, use or disclose personal information for 
purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the 
circumstances.”43  
PIPEDA’s structure appears less focussed than that of PPIPS. It contains six parts44, 
only the first two and last of which contain any legislation. Inspired by the Canadian 
Standards Association’s Model Code, a voluntary code of conduct, PIPEDA sets out 
the principles governing, among others things, the use, collection, storage and 
communication of information not in the body of the legislation, but rather in a 
Schedule 145. The voluntary nature of this legislation is further emphasised by s. 5(2) 
that specifies: “[t]he word “should”, when used in Schedule 1, indicates a 
recommendation and does not impose an obligation”, and by the fact that, unlike the 
Quebec Privacy Commission, the decisions of which are executable by the Superior 
Court of Quebec, the Federal Privacy Commissioner’s report must be brought before 
the Federal Court for hearing46. The Federal Privacy Commission would seem to play 
an advisory role to industry as it can investigate a complaint,47 assist in resolving a 
complaint through various dispute mechanisms,48 or conduct audits49. It cannot levy 
fines and render enforceable judgements.  
                                            
43 Supra note 5 at s. 3. 
44 Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, Electronic Documents, Amendments to the Canada 
Evidence Act, Amendments to the Statutory Instruments Act, Amendments to the Statute Revision Act, and 
Coming into Force – and three Schedules – the CSA standards, Acts of Parliament, and Regulations and other 
instruments. 
45 These principles are: Accountability; Identifying Purposes; Consent; Limiting Collection; Limiting Use, 
Disclosure, and Retention; Accuracy; Safeguards; Openness; Individual Access; and Challenging Compliance. 
46 Supra note 5, at s. 14(1). 
47 Ibid., at s. 11(2). 
48 Ibid., at s. 12.1(2). 
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Despite the comment of the former Quebec Privacy Commissioner, Paul-André 
Comeau, upon reading the Bill that was to become PIPEDA, that PPIPS was aimed at 
giving effect to privacy rights whereas PIPEDA focussed on the facilitation of 
commerce50, as discussed below, with respect to the efficient response to Industry 
Challenges, neither law plays a particularly facilitating role. The pages that follow, 
therefore, focus on the provisions of both laws that are most relevant in the context of 
an Industry Challenge: consent, personal information, collection, use, communication, 
and exceptions.  
3.2.3 The Provisions 
The importance of consent as well as the broad definition of Personal Information and 
the restrictions placed on its collection, use, and transfer can severely impede an 
organization’s response to an Industry Challenge. 
3.2.3.1 Consent 
A foundational principle of the FIPs, consent is the most obvious restriction PPIPS 
and PIPEDA place on an organization’s ability to respond to an Industry Challenge. 
Whereas PIPEDA requires “[t]he knowledge and consent of the individual […] for the 
collection, use, or disclosure of personal information, except where inappropriate”51, 
PPIPS only obliges the collector to inform the subject of the object of the file, the use 
to which the information will be put, the person within the organisation who will have 
access to it and where the files will be kept and the rights of access and 
                                                                                                                                         
49 Ibid., at s. 18. 
50 Scassa, Teresa and Deturbide, Michael, Electronic Commerce and Internet Law in Canada, 2nd. Ed., Toronto, 
CCH Canada Limited, 2012, at 97. 
51 Supra note 5, at Schedule 1, Principle 4.3. 
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rectification.52 The individual’s consent, however, is required for a use or transmission 
different from the original stated use or transmission.53 PPIPS is firm that “[c]onsent to 
the collection, communication or use of personal information must be manifest, free 
and enlightened, and must be given for specific purposes. Such consent is valid only 
for the length of time needed to achieve the purpose for which it was requested”.54  
While PIPEDA requires a subject’s consent for the collection, use, and 
communication of Personal Information, it is more flexible than PPIPS on the nature 
of this consent. The law allows for consent to be provided in different ways depending 
on the sensitivity of the information sought. It recognises that “[t]he form of the 
consent sought by the organization may vary, depending upon the circumstances and 
the type of information”55. It also states that: 
“[t]he way in which an organization seeks consent may vary, 
depending on the circumstances and the type of information 
collected. An organization should generally seek express consent 
when the information is likely to be considered sensitive. Implied 
consent would generally be appropriate when the information is less 
sensitive”56.  
This approach to information collection was the subject of Randall v. Nubodys Fitness 
Centres in which the Federal Court adopted the view of the Privacy Commissioner 
that information concerning the number of times an employee used a fitness facility 
on an employer-sponsored plan and communicated this information to the employer, 
constituted information that was at the lower end of the sensitivity scale and therefore 
                                            
52 Supra note 8, at s. 8. 
53 Ibid., at ss. 12 and 13. 
54 Ibid., at s. 14. 
55 Supra note 5 at Schedule 1, Principle 4.3.4. 
56 Ibid., at Schedule 1, Principle 4.3.6. 
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implied, rather than explicit, consent was appropriate for its collection and 
transmission.57 This decision illustrates the court’s willingness to balance competing 
interest so as to reach a decision that is reasonable under the circumstances. 
3.2.3.2 Personal Information 
PIPPS and PIPEDA provide for excessively inclusive definitions of personal 
information. According to PPIPS, personal information includes “any information 
which relates to a natural person and allows that person to be identified”,58 according 
to PIPEDA, it includes any “information about an identifiable individual”59 (“Personal 
Information”). Both laws allow exceptions for employee information.60 The point to 
retain though is that, as defined in both laws, personal information is much broader in 
scope than private information. For example, information may be public, such as a 
telephone number, but still qualify as personal information requiring protection under 
PPIPS and PIPEDA.   
Moreover, as discussed below, although PPIPS and PIPEDA recognise some 
exceptions to the extremely inclusive definition of Personal Information, these 
exceptions do not allow for the type of information required by Industry Challenges. 
As argued in the next chapter, a definition that excludes: 1. data made public by the 
subject; 2. employee data necessary for the operation of an enterprise; and 3. data 
                                            
57 2010 FC 681 (CanLII) at 12.  
58 Supra note 8 at s. 2. 
59 Supra note 5, at s. 2. 
60See description of “business contact information in PIPEDA. Ibid., at s. 2. Likewise, in “Le marketing direct : les 
obligations des entreprises”, the Commission d’accès à l’information du Québec explains that implicit consent 
exists between employees and management for the use of nominative lists defined in s. 22(3) of PPIPS to 
include the name, telephone number, geographic or technological address of the person in question. See 
www.cai.gouv.qc.ca. 
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required to participate in programs destined to remedy social inequality, would greatly 
improve a Quebec company’s ability to respond to their client’s diversity initiatives.  
3.2.3.3 Collection 
PPIPS and PIPEDA also restrict the scope of information that an organization is 
permitted to collect and regulate the methods used to collect it. Both the federal and 
the provincial laws subject the collection of information to strict content and 
procedural requirements and prevent an employer from fishing for information on its 
employees. PPIPS requires a “serious and legitimate reason”61 for the collection, 
whereas PIPEDA requires a reasonable purpose62. Moreover, PPIPS states that the 
information collected must be “only the information necessary for the object of the 
file”,63 and PIPEDA’s Limiting Collection Principle suggests an organization collect 
only that information necessary for the purposes identified by the organization64.  
Both laws require the collection to occur through lawful means. PPIPS forbids an 
enterprise from not responding to a request for goods, services or employment if an 
individual fails to provide personal information unless such information was necessary 
to perform the contract, the collection is authorised by law or there are reasonable 
grounds to believe the request was not lawful.65 It confirms that “[i]n case of doubt, 
personal information is deemed to be non-necessary”.66 Likewise, PIPEDA prevents 
an organization from making consent to collect, use or disclose information a 
                                            
61 Supra note 8, at s. 4. 
62 Supra note 5, at s. 3. 
63 Supra note 8, at s. 5. 
64 Supra note 5 at Schedule 1, Principle 4.4. 
65 Supra note 8, at s. 9. 
66 Ibid. 
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precondition to the supply of a product or service.67 The limits placed on collection 
would, among other things, prevent employers from scouring social media sites for 
information on their employees since the amount of information available on these 
sites, and inadvertently collected in the process, would surely exceed that which is 
necessary for the object of the file.68  
3.2.3.4 Use 
Closely linked to the restrictions placed on the collection of information are the rigid 
use requirements contained in PPIPS and PIPEDA. According to both laws, the use 
to which the information may be put must be reasonable or legitimate, it must be 
expressed to the person whose information is collected and it cannot be changed 
without the consent of the individual involved. Once the object of the file has been 
achieved, as stated above, PIPPS prevents the information from being used in 
another way without the consent of the person and subject to a retention schedule 
prescribed by law.69 Likewise, PIPEDA states that “[p]ersonal information shall not be 
used or disclosed for purposes other than those for which it was collected, except 
with the consent of the individual or as required by law”.70  
The restrictions placed on use prevent an organization from repurposing information 
which is in the public domain without the consent of the individual concerned. 
Although information contained in public registries or court reporters is considered to 
                                            
67 Supra note 5, at Principle 4.3.3. 
68 This is an observation made by the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta in “Guidelines 
for Social Medial Background Checks”, December 2011, at 3. 
69 Supra note 8, at s. 12.  
70 Supra note 5, at Schedule 1, Principle 4.5. 
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be publicly available, this information cannot be used for a purpose other than that for 
which it was used in the registries or reporters without the subject’s consent.71 Also, 
while PIPEDA regulations consider information that an individual has provided to a 
“magazine, book or newspaper, in printed or electronic form” to be publicly available, 
and not subject to consent, if another use is to be made of the information without the 
owner’s consent, the information in question must have been provided by the owner – 
thus excluding unauthorised biographies – and the subsequent collection, use, and 
communication of this information subject to what a reasonable person would 
consider appropriate in the circumstances.72  
In instances in which organisations respond to several calls for tender daily, some of 
which contain Industry Challenges, PPIPS’ and PIPEDA’s provisions on the collection 
and use of Personal Information create a situation that is both cumbersome and 
highly inefficient to manage. It would appear that this legislation requires the 
employee’s consent to collect and use its information for each Challenge – as the 
legislation prevents the repurposing of information or its use in a way other than for 
that which the original consent was requested. It is difficult to understand how this 
could be anything but frustrating for an employee who is repeatedly solicited to 
consent to providing the same information.  
3.2.3.5 Communication 
As discussed more extensively in Chapter 5, another major obstacle to effective 
participation in an Industry Challenge is the constraint on communication of personal 
                                            
71 Supra note 50 at 148-149. 
72 Ibid., at 150. 
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information imposed by PPIPS and PIPEDA. Both PPIPS and PIPEDA require the 
consent of the person concerned before their personal information can be 
communicated.73 PIPPS also imposes obligations on the person communicating the 
information to ensure that the recipient has safeguards offering the same protection of 
this information as the original holder.74 This can present a substantial obstacle in the 
event that information must be sent abroad notably to the United States, that, as 
previously described, does not have the same approach as Canada to the protection 
of personal information.  
Furthermore, even if, as noted above, PPIPS s. 23 allows for the communication of 
nominative lists of clients, members or employees, provided the person concerned 
has been given the opportunity to refuse consent,75 the commercial value of these 
nominative lists remains minimal without the relevant personal information. As 
evidenced in Deschesnes v. Groupe Jean Coutu (P.J.C.) Inc76 in which Groupe Jean 
Coutu was held to be in violation of PPIPS for transmitting the names and mailing 
addresses of clients suffering from diabetes to an industry-sponsored event on the 
illness, the value of the list was not the name and address of the client, but the fact 
that these were connected to a person suffering from diabetes. The information 
                                            
73 Supra note 5 at s. 13, and supra note 1 at Schedule 1, Principle 4.3. 
74 Ibid., at s. 17. With respect to safeguards, s. 10 specifies that “[a] person carrying on an enterprise must take 
the security measures necessary to ensure the protection of the personal information collected, used, 
communicated, kept or destroyed and that are reasonable given the sensitivity of the information, the purpose for 
which it is to be used, the quantity and distribution of the information and the medium on which it is stored.” 
Interestingly, PIPEDA Schedule 1, Principle 4.7 provides greater detail and guidance on appropriate safeguards 
than PPIPS. While PIPEDA does not appear to require the recipient of information to have in place the same 
safeguards as the sender, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner recommends informing individuals of the 
possibility that their information may be sent to another organisation and, if this organisation is outside Canada, 
of the laws applicable in the recipient jurisdiction, supra note 50, at p. 168-169. 
75 Supra note 8 at s. 17(2). 
76 [2000] C.A.I., 216.  
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pertaining to the individual’s health, not surprisingly, was deemed by the Quebec 
Privacy Commissioner to be personal and therefore subject to protection. Without this 
information, however, it is difficult to see what value the nominative list could provide. 
3.2.3.6 Exception  
Despite the limits PPIPS and PIPEDA place on the collection, use, and 
communication of personal information, certain exceptions exist. These can be 
grouped into two categories. First, the restrictions do not apply to the collection, use 
and communication of Public Information. Second, they do not apply to activity that 
falls broadly into three categories: a) journalistic and scholarly purposes; b) 
information concerning an individual whose consent may not be obtained in time to 
protect his or her interests (such as health); and c) information required by law or 
related to law enforcement.77 It should be noted, however, that according to the 
Supreme Court in Spencer, “lawful authority” in PEPIDA s. 7(3)(c.1)(ii) does not 
create a police search and seizure power.78 A warrant is still required by law 
enforcement agents requesting information under this provision.  
**** 
Canada’s approach to privacy protection reflects a mixture of competing legal 
influences. Laws such as PPIPS and PIPEDA that are based on the same FIPs as 
their European counterparts, explicitly recognise privacy as a right by protecting the 
collection, use, and transmission of Personal Information. When, however, this right 
                                            
77 Supra note 5, at.7; supra note 8, at. 1, 6, 7 and 18. 
78 Supra note 12 at para. 71.  
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conflicts with other rights, such as freedom of the press, workplace surveillance or 
criminal law, a more tempered protection of privacy is often adopted by the courts. In 
these cases, privacy is far from an absolute right and even sometimes more of a 
concept or backdrop against which a conflict is resolved. Moreover, the restrictions 
these laws place on a company’s effective participation in an Industry Challenge fail 
to acknowledge a present market reality that did not exist as widely at the time they 
were enacted. Indeed, the broad definition these laws provide of Personal Information 
as well as the restrictions they place on its collection, use, and transfer without the 
subject’s consent render it practically impossible for an organisation to respond 
satisfactorily to an Industry Challenge. This, in turn, places Quebec companies at a 
competitive disadvantage. It could be that existing legislation, having emerged during 
the third wave of privacy protection referred to above, is no longer adapted to 
contemporary needs? If so, what can be done to address this? Some possible 
solutions explored in the next two chapters are: amending or purposefully interpreting 
certain provisions of PPIPS and PIPEDA (Chapter 4) or, failing this, challenging these 
laws for their infringement on a company’s right to commercial expression (Chapter 
5).   
  
 
 
 
Chapter 4.  
Purposefully Interpreting Quebec’s Privacy Legislation 
Although An Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private 
Sector1 and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act2 
purport to enable individuals to control the information that concerns them, these laws 
present substantial obstacles to companies wishing to participate in Industry 
Challenges (as defined in the Introduction). Shifts in business models and market 
trends require a rethinking not only of the reasons and methods used to protect data 
but, more concretely, of the measures required of present privacy legislation to 
accommodate a company’s right to express itself commercially.  
 The present chapter is one of two that explores the interpretive, legislative, and 
judicial recourses that might be taken to permit a business to respond efficiently and 
effectively to an Industry Challenge. Focussing on the interpretive and legislative 
changes that could be brought to PPIPS and PIPEDA, it questions whether it is not 
time to review certain provisions so as to better align the laws with current 
commercial realities discussed in the Introduction. It applies the risk analysis 
developed by Gratton in her purposive approach to interpreting the concept of 
Personal Information (as defined in Chapter 3), and argues that the notion of 
Personal Information in PPIPS and PIPEDA should be interpreted or amended to 
exclude information: 1. made publicly available by the individual; 2. collected by an 
                                            
1 Chapter P-39.1 (“PPIPS”). 
2 S.C. 2000, c. 5 (“PIPEDA”). 
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employer and that is necessary for the proper functioning of its enterprise; and 3. 
required to respond to programs aimed at remedying social inequality. 
4.1 A Purposive Approach to PPIPS and PIPEDA 
The impediments PPIPS and PIPEDA pose to companies seeking to respond to an 
Industry Challenge raise many questions not the least of which are what exactly 
should data protection laws by protecting? Are PPIPS and PIPEDA protecting it? 
Could changes be brought to these laws that would facilitate private sector 
participation in Industry Challenges without compromising the individual’s right to 
protect information he or she deems private? The pages that follow review the 
purpose for data protection laws (“DLP”s), examine an alternative method of 
approaching such protection, and suggest three interpretive / legislative changes to 
PPIPS and PIPEDA that would accommodate companies responding to Industry 
Challenges without compromising the individual’s right to protect their Personal 
Information.  
4.1.1 What Should DLPs be Protecting? 
An answer to this question requires a review of present privacy risks. If Gratton’s 
hypothesis is correct that a fourth wave of privacy concerns is upon us, then DLPs 
that focus on control of Personal Information - in response to concerns characteristic 
of the third wave of privacy protection - may not be as relevant as they once were. 
Increased volumes of information, new types of information collection tools (such as 
cookies), new identifying methods (such as aggregation and collection of data, data 
mining, and convergence in technologies), new uses of information (such as law 
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enforcement, research and development, and targeted advertising), and increased 
availability of data, challenge not only the notion of an identifiable individual but the 
very possibility of control.3 In this new environment, Personal Information, according 
to Gratton, becomes a concept that is at once over inclusive and under inclusive, 
riddled with uncertainty and, in some circumstances, even obsolete.4 At present, 
providing individuals with absolute control over their Personal Information both 
disrupts the flow of information that is important to society and prevents collection, 
use and communication for otherwise legitimate ends.  
4.1.2 Alternate Approach to Protecting Privacy 
In light of the above, DLPs allowing the individual exclusive control over Personal 
Information appear inadequate to cope with the challenges of the fourth wave of 
privacy concerns. But instead of doing away with them, Gratton proposes a purposive 
interpretation that measures the risks of harm posed to the individual in the event his 
or her Personal Information were to be mishandled. As this approach will be useful in 
justifying the three amendments, discussed below, that might be brought to PPIPS 
and PIPEDA, it warrants some attention.  
4.1.2.1 Purposive Interpretation 
To address the shortcomings of PPIPS and PIPEDA, Gratton suggests adopting a 
purposive interpretation of Personal Information in which only information that 
presents a risk of harm to the individual would be protected. Referring to Aharon 
                                            
3 Gratton, Eloise, Understanding Personal Information: Managing Privacy Risks, Markham, ON, Lexis Nexis 
Canada Inc., 2013 at 21-55. 
4 Ibid., at 91-141. 
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Barak's work, she explains this approach by stating that: “[e]stablishing the ultimate 
purpose (and therefore, the relevant legal meaning) depends on the relationship 
between the subjective and objective purposes – that is, between the original intent of 
the text’s author and the intent of a reasonable author and of the legal system at the 
time of interpretation”.5 As the ultimate purpose of data protection legislation is to 
“protect individuals against a risk of harm that may be triggered by organisations 
collecting, using and disclosing their personal information”, a purposive interpretation 
of Personal Information takes into consideration the fact that risks are a function: 
“of several variables, such as situation-specific circumstances, the 
intentions of the parties involved, the kind of information being sought 
and the way it is processed. Other variables include the historical 
context, the particular type of technology in question, the political 
environment, the nature of the information within a given context and 
the vulnerability of the individual.”6  
Assessing what information poses a risk, and therefore qualifies as Personal 
Information, requires identifying the activity – collection, use, transmission – 
which causes the risk as well as the importance and extent of the risk.7 Gratton 
divides risk into two categories, subjective and objective, maintaining that data 
that are collected or disclosed risk causing only subjective harm. She adds that 
with respect to data that is collected, the risk is triggered only when the data is 
disclosed and therefore the collection of data generally should not be covered 
by DLPs.8 Furthermore, whether disclosed information poses a risk of harm will 
depend on its level of identifiability, intimacy, and availability: the higher the 
                                            
5 Ibid., at 157. 
6 Ibid., at 157-8. 
7 Ibid., at 180. 
8 Ibid., at 224. 
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degree of identifiability and intimacy and the lower the level of availability, the 
greater the risk of harm.9 The use of information, on the other hand, risks 
causing objective harm such as discrimination, financial or physical harm.10 
Consequently, if the use of particular data risks causing objective harm, it 
should qualify as Personal Information and be kept accurate and relevant.11 If 
its use does not have the potential to cause this harm it should not qualify as 
Personal Information.12  
4.2 Applying a Purposive Approach 
Gratton’s purposive approach, and especially, the risk analysis it contains, will 
be applied in the pages that follow to demonstrate how three changes to PPIPS 
and PIPEDA would greatly improve a company’s ability to respond to Industry 
Challenges while at the same time minimising individual privacy risks. All three 
require interpreting Personal Information to exclude: 1. data made publicly 
available by the individual; 2. employee data necessary for the operation of an 
enterprise; and 3. data required by programs intended to remedy social 
inequalities. 
4.2.1 Data Made Publicly Available by the Individual  
Adapting the definition of Personal Information in PPIPS and PIPEDA to 
exclude information that has been deliberately disclosed by its owner, for 
example over social media, poses neither an objective nor a subjective risk of 
                                            
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., at 225. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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harm to the individual but provides the company with access to and use of the 
information it requires to respond to an Industry Challenge. Indeed, the blanket 
protection of Personal Information PPIPS and PIPEDA provide seems 
unjustifiable in an era of social media when individuals are at liberty to, and do, 
share varying degrees of intimate information with 400 of their “closest” friends. 
Does this shared information, for all intents and purposes, not become public? 
And if so, why should employers be prevented from using it - especially if it 
poses little or no risk of harm to the individual? 
The following three examples, all involving social media, illustrate how PPIPS 
and PIPEDA are overly restrictive on the information businesses seek to 
collect, use, and communicate without in fact offering protection to individuals 
who have chosen to disclose the information.  
4.2.1.1 Facebook 
Although employers are discouraged from scouring Facebook accounts to 
collect information on their employees, this same information, depending on the 
Facebook account settings, may be admissible evidence in the context of a 
trial. In fact, in Campeau et Services alimentaires Delta Dailyfood Canada, 
Québec’s Commission des Lésions Professionnelles states that this evidence 
“si elle a été obtenue légalement, ne constitue pas une atteinte à la vie privée. 
Facebook fait partie de la vie publique et ceci même si la personne a mis des 
paramètres privés pour la protéger”.13 If a subject has chosen to share 
                                            
13 2012 QCCLP 7666 at para. 37. 
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information with what in the court’s eyes, constitutes the public, why should this 
information not be considered Public Information (as defined in Chapter 3) for 
the purposes of PPIPS and PIPEDA? 
4.2.1.2 LinkedIn 
An even greater incongruity exists with respect to LinkedIn since the subject is 
allowed to use their job title and their employer’s name to market themselves 
but the employer must obtain consent before using the same information to 
market its goods or services. LinkedIn usually provides preliminary information 
such as a subject’s photo, their professional title, the company that employs 
them and often their education to people who are not even “linked” to the 
subject in question. The photo, in and of itself, usually testifies to the gender – 
male or female14 -, frequently to ethnicity and sometimes to religious affiliation 
in the cases of religions that adhere to certain dress codes. If this information is 
readily accessible to anyone who types a name into a search engine, has it not 
acquired a public character? 
4.2.1.3 Blogging 
Finally, what about the information a blogger shares when blogging on matters 
deemed private? Should a person who blogs or publishes regularly about 
matters concerning aspects of their biographical core of information have the 
right to pursue their employer for collecting, using or communicating this 
information? Certainly this was the argument invoked by Lacoursière J. in 
                                            
14 Homosexual, transgender and bi-sexual may not be as easy to ascertain.  
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Blanc v. Éditions Bang Bang to reject the plaintiff’s claim that the photo she 
used to identify her blog had been reproduced without her consent by another 
editor thereby violating her right to her image.15 The court held that as the 
photo that had been used was the one that appeared on her blog as well as on 
her Facebook and Twitter accounts, it belonged to the public domain.  
The three examples above illustrate deliberate decisions on the part of the 
subject to render certain items of their Personal Information public. Applying 
Gratton’s risk of harm test to this information suggests that the potential harm 
from the collection and disclosure of information is non-existent as the 
individual provided the information. Likewise, the potential objective harm 
stemming from its use by the employer is difficult to conceive as the latter 
would be using it to help end discrimination. As an aside, it is interesting to note 
the similarities between the case of information made publicly available by the 
individual and the test used to establish abandonment in criminal cases 
involving s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms16. This test also 
involves balancing objective and subjective criteria to determine whether a 
reasonable expectation of privacy existed and if so, whether it was violated by 
law enforcement officials.17  
                                            
15 [2011] QCCS 2624. 
16 Constitution Act, 1982 R.S.C., 1985, App.II, no 44. (“Canadian Charter”). 
17 As discussed in Chapter 3, in R. v. Tessling [2004] 3 S.C.R. 431, and then again in R. v. Patrick [2009] 1 S.C.R. 
579 (“Patrick”), the Supreme Court elaborated a two-step test that seeks to establish first, whether the subject 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy – from both a subjective and objective perspective - and second, if such 
is the case, whether it was it violated. This test can be easily adapted to instances involving potential breaches 
of informational privacy to become: 
1. Did the subject have a reasonable expectation of privacy? 
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A more certain approach might be to amend PPIPS and PIPEDA so that the 
category of “data made public by the individual” is included in section 1 of the 
former or subsections 7(1); 7(2) and 7(3) of the latter. Such an amendment 
would not be out of keeping with other data protection regimes such as art. 
8(2)(e) of EU Directive 95/46/EC that specifically exempts from the prohibition 
against the processing of certain types of sensitive data “data which are 
manifestly made public by the data subject”.18 
4.2.2 Employee Data Necessary for the Operation of an 
Enterprise 
A second category of data that should be excluded from the definition of 
Personal Information is information necessary for the proper operation of an 
enterprise. This could be accomplished by adopting a purposive understanding 
                                                                                                                                         
A. What is the subject matter of the information collected / used / communicated? 
B. Did the subject have a direct interest in the contents? 
C. Did the subject have a subjective expectation of privacy in the information collected / used / 
communicated? 
D. If so, was the expectation objectively reasonable considering the following: 
a. Place where the collection / use / communication occurred? Was there a trespass 
involved?  
b. Was the informational content of the subject matter in public view? 
c. Whether the information content of the subject matter had been abandoned? 
d. Whether such information was already in the hands of third parties; if so, was it subject 
to an obligation of confidentiality? 
e. Whether the organization’s technique was intrusive in relation to the privacy interest. 
f. Whether the use of surveillance technology / evidence gathering technique was itself 
objectively unreasonable. 
g. Whether the informational content exposed any intimate details of the subject’s 
lifestyle, or information of a biographical nature.  
2. If a reasonable expectation of privacy existed, was it violated? 
When the above test is applied to the three social media examples, a conclusion similar to the one reached when 
applying Gratton’s analysis can be drawn. Indeed, it appears that while a subjective expectation of privacy may 
well exist, the subject’s behaviour negates any possible objective expectation thereby rendering the information 
public. 
18 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and of the free 
movement of such data, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf.   
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of “necessary” in s. 5 of PPIPS or even broadening the meaning of PIPEDA’s s. 
4.01: “in relation to their employment, business or profession”19. This 
interpretation is not out of keeping with a certain branch of jurisprudence on the 
information a Quebec employer is allowed to collect. PIPPS limits employers to 
collecting only information that is “necessary for the object of the file”. Lukasz 
Granosik, in his review of case law on the concept of “necessary” in the privacy 
context, concludes that Quebec case law remains divided between a narrow, 
literal reading of the word “necessary” and a much broader interpretation in 
which a test similar to the Oakes test has been applied.20 Among the cases in 
this second category is that of Dubé c. Le Secretariat de L’action catholique de 
Joliette in which the tribunal, in assessing what information was necessary to 
collect in an employment context, listed three items: 1. the fulfilment of the 
employee’s duties; 2. the functioning of the enterprise; and 3. the performance 
of the employment contract.21 
Although the risk of subjective harm from disclosure of data necessary for the 
operation of an enterprise may be greater than with information deliberately 
made available by the individual, this risk can be reduced to render the 
possibility of its occurrence negligible. An employer can protect against the 
harm linked to disclosure by ensuring the information, when legitimately 
disclosed, is disclosed in such a way as to render its owner non-identifiable. It 
                                            
19 This section was added in 2015 along with the definition of “business contact information” in s. 2  
20 Granosik, Lukasz, “Le critère de nécessité: son évolution, son importance, son impact et son application», Les 
20 ans de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels dans le secteur privé (2014), Cowansville : Y. 
Blais, 2014.   
21 2004 CanLII 73641 (QC SAT) at 64. 
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can also ensure that it has sufficiently solid data protection mechanisms in 
place to reduce the risk of a leak or illegitimate disclosure. With respect to the 
use of this information, the risk seems inconceivable as the reason for which 
the information is used is to combat discrimination against individuals to whom 
the information pertains.  
An alternative to a purposive interpretation of “necessary” or “in relation to their 
employment, business of profession” that would avoid the potential for legal 
uncertainty, cited by Gratton as one of the two limits of the purposive 
approach,22 would be to amend PPIPS and PIPEDA to include a limited-use 
employee information collection provision enabling employers to collect, use, 
and communicate information that is necessary for the operation of the 
employer’s enterprise. Such a change could be made by adopting a section 
similar to Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act, s.15(1)23 and adding a 
subsection 15(1)(a)(iii) that would read “ensuring the proper functioning of the 
enterprise”. This amendment goes slightly beyond Gratton’s recommendation 
                                            
22 The other being the lack of a balance test to weigh competing values. Supra note 3 at 159.  
23 S.A. Chapter P-6-5 (“Alberta PIPA”). Alberta PIPA’s employee collection provision goes further than British 
Columbia’s Personal Information Protection Act, SBC 2003 Chapter 23 (“BC PIPA”) or PIPEDA. Section 15(1) 
reads: 
An organization may collect personal employee information about an individual without the consent of the 
individual if 
(a) the information is collected solely for the purposes of  
(i) establishing, managing or terminating an employment or volunteer-work relationship, or 
(ii) managing a post-employment or post-volunteer-work relationship 
(b) it is reasonable to collect the information for the particular purpose for which it is being collected, and 
(c) in the case of an individual who is a current employee of the organization, the organization has, before 
collecting the information, provided the individual with reasonable notification that personal employee 
information about the individual is going to be collected and of the purposes for which the information is 
going to be collected. 
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to the Commission d’accès à l’information that PPIPS should be brought in line 
with PIPEDA, Alberta PIPA and BC PIPA by enabling an employer to collect 
employee information to better manage the employee provided the employer 
notifies the latter of the type of information it may collect, how the information 
will be used and that both the collection and notice are reasonable.24  
4.2.3 Data Required by Programs Intended to Remedy Social 
Inequalities 
A third exclusion to the definition of Personal Information in PPIPS and 
PIPEDA that would enable businesses to participate in Industry Challenges 
would be information required by programs intended to remedy social 
inequalities. Again, in an employment context, such exclusion would not run 
counter to Quebec law. Although the type of information required for the 
purposes of an Industry Challenge are protected by s. 10 of the Quebec 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.25 Section 18.1 of the Quebec Charter states 
that: 
“[n]o one may, in an employment application form or employment 
interview, require a person to give information regarding any ground 
mentioned in section 10 unless the information is useful for the 
application of section 20 or the implementation of an affirmative action 
program in existence at the time of the application.”26 
Section 20 states that: 
                                            
24 Gratton, Eloise, “Updating Quebec Private Sector Privacy Law – Part 2 of 2” 
http://www.eloisegratton.com/blog/2015/12/11/updating-quebec-private-sector-privacy-law-part-2-of-2/ 
25 Every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights and freedoms, without 
distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, pregnancy, sexual orientation, civil status, age 
except as provided by law, religion, political convictions, language, ethnic or national origin, social condition, a 
handicap or the use of any means to palliate a handicap”, Quebec Charter of Human rights and Freedoms, 
CQLR, c. C-12 (“Quebec Charter”).  
26 Ibid. 
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“[a] distinction, exclusion or preference based on the aptitudes or 
qualifications required for an employment, or justified by the charitable, 
philanthropic, religious, political or educational nature of a non-profit 
institution or of an institution devoted exclusively to the well-being of an 
ethnic group, is deemed non-discriminatory.”27 
The right of an employer to collect such information was confirmed in X c. Residence 
l’Oasis Fort Saint-Louis in which the plaintiff complained that the type of information 
that was asked of her in an employment interview was excessive.28  
Similar to data necessary for the operation of an enterprise, the risk of subjective 
harm from disclosure of information required by a program intended to remedy social 
inequalities, while real, may be mitigated through the same type of measures as 
above: anonymized disclosure and solid data protection mechanisms. As with the 
other two categories of information, the potential for objective harm appears minimal 
since the intended use of the information is to end discrimination.  
Again, like with information necessary for the operation of an enterprise, to avoid 
uncertainty, PPIPS and PIPEDA might be better amended to exclude from protection, 
information required by programs intended to remedy social inequality. This 
information would form an exception similar to the exceptions for information 
collected, used, and communicated for journalistic, scholarly or research purposes. 
Interestingly, BC PIPA, in sections 12(f), 15(f), and 18(f),29 and Alberta PIPA, in 
sections 14 (f), 17 (f), and 20(l),30 allow for the collection, use, and communication of 
personal information without the individual’s consent to determine their suitability “to 
                                            
27 Ibid. 
28 [1995] no AZ-95151507 (C.A.I). 
29 Supra note 23. 
30 Supra note 22. 
73 
 
receive an honour, award or similar benefit”. Presuming the type of data required for 
the honor or award may be much the same as the information required to respond to 
an Industry Challenge, it is not inconceivable that PPIPS and PIPEDA should include 
an exception for data required by a program intended to remedy social inequalities.  
**** 
A purposive approach to the interpretation of PPIPS and PIPEDA grounded in a risk 
assessment of the harm to individuals in the event of a breach, is helpful in 
understanding what amendments, interpretative as well as legislative, could be made 
to PPIPS and PIPEDA to enable greater flexibility with respect to the Personal 
Information a business can collect, use, and disclose in the context of an Industry 
Challenge without noticeably increasing the risk of harm to the individual. These 
changes, among others, could include interpreting Personal Information to exclude 
data made publicly available by the individual, employee data necessary for the 
operation of an enterprise, and data required by programs intended to remedy social 
inequalities.  
The advantage of purposefully interpreting Quebec’s private sector privacy legislation 
is the leeway it provides a company to exercise its right to express itself in response 
to ever changing market demands. One of its drawbacks, however, remains the 
potential for legal uncertainty. Certainty, however, may only be achievable through 
legislative change and perhaps, as discussed in the next chapter, through judicial 
review.
 
 
Chapter 5.  
Challenging Quebec’s Private Sector Privacy Legislation 
The fact that, in Canada, rights are not absolute is clearly set out in s.1 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that states: “[t]he Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to 
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society”.1 Privacy, therefore, frequently requires balancing against 
other competing rights and interests. As discussed in the Introduction, this was 
reiterated in 2013 by the Supreme Court of Canada (“Supreme Court”), in Alberta 
(Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial Workers, 
Local 4012, that held Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act3 to be 
unconstitutional for violating a union’s right to express itself as per s. 2(b) of the 
Canadian Charter. The U.F.C.W. decision is particularly interesting as it provides 
some indication of the approach a court might take in interpreting a conflict between 
the right to privacy and a company’s use of workforce demographics to market itself – 
in so far as this practice constitutes a form of commercial expression. 
In light of the U.F.C.W. decision then, this chapter considers the possible Canadian 
Charter challenges a company could bring against An Act Respecting the Protection 
of Personal Information in the Private Sector4 and the Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Documents Act5 in the event the enforcement of this legislation 
                                            
1 Constitution Act, 1982 R.S.C., 1985, App.II, no 44 (“Canadian Charter”). 
2 [2013] 3 S.C.R. 733 (“U.F.C.W.”). 
3 S.A. 2003, Chapter P-6.5 (“Alberta PIPA”). 
4 Chapter P-39.1 (“PPIPS”) 
5 S.C. 2000 c. 5 (“PIPEDA”). 
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prevented the company from responding to an Industry Challenge (as defined in 
Chapter 4). In essence, this chapter sets out the arguments a company might invoke 
were it to be pursued for having violated PPIPS and / or PIPEDA in responding to an 
Industry Challenge. If, as described in the Introduction, Industry Challenges are a 
form of commercial expression, a company defending against a privacy violation 
claim could argue, much as the union did in U.F.C.W. that, as drafted, existing privacy 
legislation violates its right to express itself under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter.   
The pages that follow begin by presenting the reasoning adopted by courts in 
instances of judicial review. They then apply this reasoning to a hypothetical 
challenge of PPIPS and PIPEDA. While it could be argued that both these laws 
violate a company’s right to express itself commercially, their vulnerability in the 
instance of a judicial review is not the same. Although a court would probably hold 
PPIPS’ and PIPEDA’s respective objectives to be justifiable, in the case of PIPEDA, 
the methods used to meet these objectives appear to cause more than a minimal 
impairment to an organisation. In the case of both PPIPS and PIPEDA, the objectives 
are disproportionate to the benefits the laws purport to confer.  
5.1 Judicial Review  
A constitutional challenge to any law requires a two-part analysis in which the court 
must first, determine whether the law in question breaches a Canadian Charter right 
and second, whether such breach is justifiable in a free and democratic society.  
5.1.1 Proving the Violation 
To prove a violation, the plaintiff must demonstrate, according to civil standards, that 
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the law violates a right protected by the Canadian Charter.6 Once this is 
accomplished, the burden of proof shifts to the legislator to justify its law.7 Peter Hogg 
notes that in assessing whether a right has been violated, it is essential to define the 
right as one that is worth protecting. He states that “[e]ach right should be so 
interpreted as not to reach behaviour that is outside the purpose of the right – 
behaviour that is not worthy of constitutional protection”.8 A purposive rather than a 
generous interpretation is, therefore, preferable.  
5.1.2 Justifying the Violation: the Oakes Test 
The second step in the judicial review of legislation is set out in the case of R. v. 
Oakes in which the Supreme Court, to determine whether the law in question was 
justifiable in a free and democratic society, examined two issues: 1. whether “the 
objective which the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are 
designed to serve, [were] of ‘sufficient importance to warrant overriding a 
constitutionally protected right or freedom”; and 2. once the sufficiently significant 
objective was recognized, whether “the means chosen [were] reasonable and 
demonstrably justified”.9 To determine whether the means chosen were reasonable, 
the court examined three further questions: 1. whether “measures adopted [were] 
carefully designed to achieve the objective in question”; 2. whether the means 
“impair[ed], ‘as little as possible’ the right or freedom in question and; 3. whether there 
was a “proportionality between the effects of the measures which [were] responsible 
                                            
6 Hogg, Peter, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed., vol. 2 Toronto: Carswell, 2014 at 38-8. 
7 Ibid., at 38-7. 
8 Ibid., at 38-6. 
9 [1986] S.C.R. 103 at 138-139 (“Oakes”). 
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for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which [had] been identified 
as of ‘sufficient importance’”.10 Hogg summarises the effects of the Oakes test as 
follows:  
“it is step 3 – least drastic means – that is the centre of the inquiry into 
s. 1 justification. Only in a rare case will a court reject the legislative 
judgement that the objective of the law is sufficiently important to justify 
limiting a Charter right (step 1). It is an even rarer case where the law is 
not rationally connected to the objective (step 2). And the inquiry into 
disproportionate effect (step 4) is normally, if not always, precluded by 
the judgement that the law’s objective is sufficiently important to justify 
the impact on the Charter right (step 1).”11 
Each of these steps, however, warrants greater explanation. 
5.1.2.1 Sufficiently Important Objective 
Although rare that a court will invalidate a law because of its objective, the definition 
of this objective is essential to determining the direction the judicial review will take. 
Hogg explains that the higher the level of generality at which the legislative objective 
is framed, the more desirable the objective will appear.12 The review of a law with 
broadly framed objectives will thus focus on the second part of the Oakes analysis, 
that is to say, the proportionality and the means used to accomplish the objectives.13 
If, on the other hand, the objectives are narrowly defined, it will be difficult to conceive 
of alternative and less onerous means of fulfilling these.14 Hogg concludes that “[t]he 
statement of the objective should therefore be related to the infringement of the 
Charter, rather than to other goals. In other words, the statement of the objective 
                                            
10 Ibid. 
11 Supra note 6 at 38-18.  
12 Ibid., at 38-19. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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should supply a reason for infringing the Charter right”.15 He also explains that the 
objectives of a law cannot be justified under s.1 if they are incompatible with the 
values embodied in the Canadian Charter or if they are ultra vires the enacting 
legislative body on federal distribution of power grounds.16 Likewise, the objective of 
the legislation cannot shift over time to reflect changing social conditions.17 This last 
restriction may prove increasingly fatal to PPIPS and PEPIDA that reflect concerns of 
the third wave of privacy protection, described in the Introduction, but that are 
becoming ill-adapted to privacy concerns of the fourth wave.  
5.1.2.2 Rational Connection 
In analysing the rational connection, the court must determine whether the law, as it is 
drafted, fulfils the objectives it set out to accomplish. In R. v. Edwards Books and Art, 
the court explained that “[t]he requirement of rational connection calls for an 
assessment of how well the legislative garment has been tailored to suit its 
purpose”.18 Ironically, Oakes is an example in which the law was struck down on the 
rational connection test as the court found that there was no rational connection 
between possession of a narcotic and the intent to traffic.  
5.1.2.3 Minimum Impairment 
Referred to by Hogg as the “heart and soul of s. 1 justification”, the minimum 
impairment analysis seeks to establish whether the law under review pursues its 
                                            
15 Ibid., at 38-20. 
16 Ibid., at 38-26. 
17 Ibid. 
18 [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at 770. 
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objective by the least drastic means possible. 19  In so doing, however, it will allow the 
legislator a margin of appreciation, especially when the following matters are 
involved: protection of a vulnerable group (such as children), complex social-science 
evidence necessary to make the case; complex social issues; competing interest 
groups, and allocation of scarce resources.20 As a result, Hogg argues, the 
jurisprudence on this second step tends to be unpredictable.21  
5.1.2.4 Proportionate Effect 
The third and final step of the second part of the Oakes test has not been used to 
invalidate legislation in Canada. Although Hogg explains this by qualifying it as 
redundant,22 the step merits some scrutiny as it might indeed prove relevant to a 
judicial review of PPIPS and PIPEDA. The proportionate effect step assesses 
whether the law, despite the rational connection between its objective and means, 
and regardless of having used the least drastic means possible, is still too high a 
price for violating a right protected by the Canadian Charter. The value of this last 
step is well described by Aharon Barak who explains that “[p]roportionality examines 
the relationship between the object and the means of reaching it”.23 He argues that in 
certain circumstances advancing the general interest might not justify the limitation to 
the human right.24 Consequently, according to Barak:  
                                            
19 Supra note 6 at 38-36. 
20 Ibid., at 38-43. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., at 38-44. 
23 “Proportionality Effect: The Israeli Experience”, (2007), 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 369, at 371. 
24 Ibid. 
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“[t]his test examines the proper correlation between the benefit 
stemming from attainment of the proper object and the extent of its 
effect upon the constitutional right. It focuses upon the results of the 
statute. It examines the proper ratio between the benefit stemming 
from attainment of the object and the deleterious effect upon the 
human right. Whereas the rational connection test and the least 
harmful measure test are essentially determined against the 
background of the proper objective, and are derived from the need to 
realize it, the test of proportionality (stricto sensu) examines whether 
the realization of this proper objective is commensurate with the 
deleterious effect upon the human right. It is a principle of balancing. 
It requires placing colliding values and interests side by side and 
balancing them according to their weight.”25  
This last paragraph also appears in Chief Justice McLachlin’s majority decision in 
Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony.26 Chief Justice McLachlin explains 
that “[t]he final stage of Oakes allows for a broader assessment of whether the 
benefits of the impugned law are worth the cost of the rights limitation”.27 In other 
words “are the overall effects of the law on the claimant disproportionate to the 
government’s objectives”.28 In order to assess this, McLachlin sets out a three-step 
analysis to determine: 1. the salutary effects of the law; 2. its deleterious effects; and 
3. the outcome once these are weighed against each other.29 Each of these steps will 
be applied below to review the constitutionality of PPIPS and PIPEDA. 
5.2 Judicially Reviewing PPIPS and PIPEDA 
While the success of a challenge to PPIPS’ and PIPEDA’s objectives would appear 
slim, as it requires convincing a court that the fourth wave of privacy challenges that 
now affect us has rendered legislation developed during the third wave irrelevant, in 
                                            
25 Ibid., at 374. 
26 [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 at 606-7 (“Hutterian Brethren”). 
27 Ibid. at 605. 
28 Ibid. at 604. 
29 Ibid. at pp. 607-615. 
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the case of an Industry Challenge, the means used by PIPEDA to realise its 
objectives present more than a minimal impairment of an organisation’s right. Serious 
consideration should also be given to the disproportionate effect PPIPS and PIPEDA 
have on an organization’s freedom to express itself commercially.  
5.2.1 Violation of the Right to Commercial Expression 
In the same way the United Food and Commercial Workers Local 401, in U.F.C.W., 
challenged Alberta PIPA by arguing that it violated the union’s right to express itself, 
an organisation could challenge PPIPS and PIPEDA for impeding its right to respond 
to an Industry Challenge and, by extension, to express itself commercially. Since the 
Introduction and Chapter 3 describe how Industry Challenges are a form of 
commercial expression and the ways in which PPIPS and PIPEDA prevent 
companies from effectively responding to these Challenges, the paragraphs that 
follow will not revisit these arguments. They will start from the premise that Quebec’s 
private sector privacy legislation violates a company’s right to express itself 
commercially and proceed directly to an analysis of this violation according to the 
Oakes test.   
5.2.2 Privacy: A Sufficiently Important Objective 
Challenging PPIPS’ and PIPEDA’s objectives may not prove the most successful 
tactic as its depends on an acknowledgement, of which there is little evidence to date, 
that legislation developed during the third wave of privacy concerns is not adapted to 
address those of the fourth wave. At present, although slightly different, PPIPS’ and 
PIPEDA’s objectives, in that they intend to provide the individual with control over 
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their information and to implement fair information practices (“FIP”s), are unlikely to 
be judged insufficiently important to justify their respective legislation. To reiterate 
what was discussed in Chapter 3, PPIPS’ express objective is to establish rules 
regarding the collection, use, and communication of information that respect the rights 
set out in articles 35 to 40 of the Civil Code of Quebec30. PIPEDA, however, seeks to 
regulate the collection, use, and communication of this same information but in such a 
way as to respect the privacy right of the individual and the needs of organizations. 
While PPIPS’ and PIPEDA’s slightly differing objectives will influence a challenge to 
these respective laws, they are unlikely to be considered sufficiently un-important to 
justify striking down either piece of legislation at this step of the judicial review.  
The only conceivable justification for a court to find PPIPS’ and PIPEDA’s objectives 
to be unimportant would be if the court were to find them no longer relevant. Such an 
argument would require demonstrating that the control over personal information 
model upon which both laws are based is, as Gratton argues, increasingly ineffective 
in an age of every increasing volumes of technology, new types of information 
collection tools, new identifying methods, new uses of information and increased 
availability of data.31 While threats to privacy may be shifting, the threats that 
characterise the third wave have yet to disappear. PPIPS and PIPEDA therefore 
remain relevant. 
                                            
30 S.Q. 1991, c.64.  
31 Gratton, Eloise, Understanding Personal Information: Managing Privacy Risks, Markham, ON, Lexis Nexis 
Canada Inc., 2013 at 21-56. 
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Moreover, the cases that are frequently cited as authoritative in matters concerning 
privacy, display reasoning typical of the third privacy wave. In R. v. Dyment, LaForest 
J. refers to Alan Westin to acknowledge that “[g]rounded in man’s physical and moral 
autonomy, privacy is essential for the well-being of the individual”.32 Similar links 
among privacy, dignity, and autonomy can be found in civil cases such as Godbout v. 
Longueil33 or Aubry v. Les Éditions Vice-Versa Inc34. Even the U.F.C.W. case 
provides a striking example of the courts’ defense of privacy as control over personal 
information.35 At this stage the courts appear unlikely to view PPIPS’ and PIPEDA’s 
objectives as un-important. 
5.2.3 Rational Connection 
So long as individual control of personal information is recognised as a sufficiently 
important objective, PPIPS and PIPEDA will probably not be found unconstitutional 
for lack of a rational connection between their objectives and the legislative measures 
proposed to achieve them. This is hardly surprising as both their provisions reflect the 
FIPs that developed internationally during the third wave of privacy protection and 
seem to be generally accepted as adequate. PPIPS’ sole objective of allowing 
                                            
32 [1988] 2. S.C.R. 417 at 427.  
33 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 at para. 65. 
34 [1998] 1 S.C.R, 591.  
35 The court justifies the quasi-constitutional status it attributes to Alberta PIPA by pointing to the legislation’s 
purpose as providing individuals with some measure of control over their personal information, control that is 
intimately connected to personal autonomy, dignity, and privacy.  The Supreme Court explains that “PIPA’s 
objective is increasingly significant in the modern context, where new technologies give organizations an almost 
unlimited capacity to collect personal information, analyse it, use it and communicate it to others for their own 
purposes”.  It identifies the three objectives the law seeks to advance as those of: 1. enabling the individual 
control over their personal information by “restricting who can collect, use and disclose personal information 
without the individual’s consent and the scope of such collection, use and disclosure”; 2. avoiding potential harm 
flowing from “permanent storage or unlimited dissemination of personal information through the Internet or other 
forms of technology without an individual’s consent”; and 3. reinforcing social values of individual autonomy, 
dignity and privacy by providing them with some measure of control over their personal information. Supra note 2 
at 747-749. 
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individuals to determine how their information will be collected, used, and 
communicated with very little left to the discretion of the organisation, except the initial 
collection that is subject to the requirement that the information be necessary36, 
places the control of personal information almost exclusively in the hands of the 
person to whom the information relates. The legislation imposes a necessity based 
collection provision for initial collection of information and subjects subsequent and 
different uses and communication to the individual’s consent. It provides mechanisms 
whereby an individual can have access to and correct any inaccurate information.  
Likewise, PIPEDA, the objective of which is to balance the competing rights of the 
individual to control the collection, use, and communication of personal information 
against those of the organisation with respect to the same information, appears 
drafted to at least attempt to reconcile these somewhat divergent interests. PIPEDA’s 
tone is more suggestive than coercive and the Principles it seeks to impose are 
based on the Canadian Standards Association Model Code that is drafted for 
industry. They reflect standard FIPs requiring consent for the collection, use, and 
communication of information and providing the individual with mechanisms to verify 
and correct inaccurate information as explained in Chapter 3.  
PIPEDA differs from PPIPS, however, on the matter of consent. While the individual’s 
consent is required for the collection, use, and communication of personal 
information, the explicitness of this consent may vary depending upon the sensitivity 
of the information involved. Collection is also subject to a reasonableness standard 
                                            
36 Supra note 4 at s.5. 
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that Lawson and O’Donoghue argue leads to an “uneasy ‘balancing test’” between 
the rights of the organisation and those of the individual.37 It is this uneasy balance 
that contributes to PIPEDA’s vulnerability in the event of judicial review. 
5.2.4 PIPEDA and Minimal Impairment 
In contrast to PPIPS’ singular and narrowly defined objective that certainly protects it 
from charges of unnecessary impairment38, the balance PIPEDA’s objective purports 
to maintain between the seemingly competing interest of the individual, who wishes to 
retain control over their personal information, and the organisation, that seeks to use 
it, especially in the context of an Industry Challenge, renders the law vulnerable to 
judicial challenge on the grounds of impairment. The importance of this equilibrium is 
frequently referred to by the courts in cases such as Englander v. Telus 
Communication in which the Federal Court of Appeal explains that:  
“even though Part I and Schedule I of the Act purport to protect the 
right of privacy, they also purport to facilitate the collection, use and 
disclosure of personal information by the private sector. In 
interpreting this legislation, the Court must strike a balance between 
two competing interests. […]”39.  
In light of the Supreme Court’s tendency to find reasonable solutions to cases 
involving conflicting rights – as discussed in Chapter 3 - and of its finding in U.F.C.W. 
that “[t]he price PIPA exacts, […], is disproportionate to the benefits it promotes”40, an 
organization would be justified in requesting a judicial review of PIPEDA. The 
                                            
37 Lawson, Philippa and O’Donoghue, Mary, “Approaches to Consent in Canadian Data Protection Law”, in Kerr, 
Lucock and Steeves, eds. On the Identity Trail: Anonymity, Privacy and Identity in a Networked Society, Oxford: 
UP, 2009, 23-42 at 33. 
38 It is difficult to conceive of a less restrictive means of giving the individual absolute control over the information 
an enterprise collects, uses, and communicates on them than by requiring prior consent to all these activities. 
39 2004 FCA 387 (CanLII) para. 46.  
40 Supra note 2 at 749. 
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organization should argue that with respect to Industry Challenges, the law 
disproportionately impairs its right to commercially express itself. It should 
demonstrate that while employee consent to the collection, use, and communication 
of his or her information may correspond to the control of personal information model 
upon which PIPEDA is based, in an employment setting, it is excessive given the 
damper it places on the employer’s ability to promote its goods or services. As 
previously discussed, conveying information on workforce demographics to a 
marketplace that is increasingly concerned with the social engagement of its vendors 
– notably its promotion of Target Groups (as defined in the Introduction) - is essential 
for a business to remain competitive.   
PIPEDA’s impairment of an organisation appears all the more disproportionate when 
compared to the risk of either subjective or objective harm to the individual. The way 
information is communicated in response to an Industry Challenge, while precise, 
does not render the individual identifiable per se. A person who wishes, for example, 
to keep their sexuality secret will be little more exposed by disclosing this information 
to a Human Resources representative who is bound to keep the information 
confidential and only to use it in responding to an Industry Challenge, than if they said 
nothing at all. This employee will simply be added to the others who come forward as 
belonging to the same Target Group. A person who wishes to keep their sexuality 
confidential is not automatically “outed” because he or she happens to be one of 5 
LGBT41 employees disclosed by the organization. An opposite case might be made in 
instances in which an employee’s biography is forwarded to justify their inclusion in a 
                                            
41 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender. 
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client team. In that a biography contains a name and is transmitted to correspond to a 
category required by the client, it is clearly more sensitive – especially in instances in 
which a photograph is included or a category that is not outwardly visible is in 
question such as one’s sexuality.  
Likewise, why should an organization be prevented from repurposing personal 
information about its employees that these employees have made public through a 
blog, a Facebook posting or a photo on LinkedIn? Would using this information not, in 
essence, be similar to the union’s use of photos of its members in public places in 
U.C.F.W.? The court found the location in which the photos were taken militated 
against any argument that what was being captured was purely personal information 
because the photograph could have been taken and used by any news media for 
journalistic purposes.42 It is unclear what PIPEDA is protecting by forbidding 
organizations from repurposing information which individuals have deliberately made 
public to respond to an Industry Challenge. 
The organization might also argue that the fact that, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, three amendments could be made to PIPEDA, to recognise the needs of the 
organisations to collect, use, and communicate personal information without for as 
much increasing the risk to the individual that this information will be misused, creates 
more than minimal impairment. To recap, these amendments are: 1. data that has 
been deliberately made public by the individual should be considered Public 
Information; 2. an employee information collection, use, and communication principle 
                                            
42 Ibid. 
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should be included in PIPEDA to allow employers to collect information that is 
necessary to the operation of the enterprise; and 3. PIPEDA should exempt activity 
related to the remedying of social inequality from activity included within the scope of 
its application.  
5.2.5 PPIPS, PIPEDA and Proportionality 
While it would appear difficult to challenge PPIPS for an insufficiently important 
objective, a lack of rational connection or minimum impairment, the legislation is 
certainly worthy of scrutiny, as is PIPEDA, for the disproportionate harm they cause 
organisations and potentially the communities in which they operate. An analysis of 
these laws according to the steps set out in Hutterian Brethren reveals that in the 
context of an Industry Challenge, the restrictions Quebec private sector privacy 
legislation places on an organisation’s ability to express itself commercially, arguably 
outweigh the risk of harm suffered by the employee in the event their personal 
information is handled in violation of existing privacy legislation. Indeed, a strict 
application of PPIPS and PIPEDA could deprive the public of information it requires to 
make informed decisions, potentially limit the competitiveness of Quebec business 
abroad, and discourage private sector engagement in affirmative action programs. 
5.2.5.1 Salutary Effect 
The transition from a third to a fourth wave of privacy concerns arguably diminishes 
PPIPS’ and PIPEDA’s salutary effects, without for as much rendering it obsolete. 
Although these laws may protect individuals against a risk of harm triggered by 
organisations collecting, using, and disclosing their personal information, this harm 
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may not be the greatest threat to privacy. In fact, the dignity, autonomy, and self-
worth associated with privacy are perhaps now threatened, as Gratton points out, by 
new information collection tools, new identifying methods, new uses of information, 
and increased availability of data, all of which render the possibility of control illusory 
and challenge what it means to identify an individual.43  So while laws that still focus 
on enabling an individual to control their personal information may have some 
salutary effect, this effect is greatly diminished given that the ill it was intended to 
remedy is changing. Their deleterious effects, however, are substantial.  
5.2.5.2 Deleterious Effect 
Many deleterious effects stem from preventing an organization from expressing itself 
commercially. Most notably, it prevents individuals from making “informed economic 
choices, an important aspect of individual self-fulfilment and personal autonomy”.44 By 
preventing an organization from collecting, using, and communicating information on 
its workforce demographics, PPIPS and PIPEDA prevent a company from acquiring 
and disclosing details about its goods and services that are becoming increasingly 
important to consumers. As discussed in the Introduction, as consumer activism 
increases, the type of information that is required to respond to Industry Challenges is 
as vital to consumers as price and quality in shaping their choice. Preventing a 
company from communicating this is not only a violation of its freedom of expression, 
it is, perhaps more importantly, depriving the public of their right to know what they 
are purchasing and from whom they are purchasing it. 
                                            
43 Supra note 31. 
44 Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 at 767.  
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A secondary consideration, but one that merits exploring, is the rendering of Quebec 
businesses less competitive than their American counterparts. Although neither the 
Canadian Charter nor the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms45 protects 
economic rights, it is nevertheless important, when weighing PPIPS’ and PIPEDA’s 
deleterious effects, to note their potential to weaken the economic competitiveness of 
Quebec businesses. If companies cannot respond to questions concerning their 
employees’ personal information with the same degree of precision as that of their 
American counterparts, they risk losing contracts, laying off staff, and potentially 
closing down – all effects that are deleterious to the Quebec economy. It should be 
recalled that the legislator never intended Quebec privacy legislation to place a 
damper on business.46 
A third consideration that is broadly linked to the impediment to commercial 
expression is discouraging industry from contributing to the rectification of social 
injustices by preventing it from participating and communicating its participation in 
affirmative action programs. Noting that “affirmative action arose in the United States 
in response to racial discrimination which was structurally ingrained, and could be 
ameliorated only through bold, systemic measures”, Drumbl and Craig attempt to 
justify the awkward relationship the Canadian courts have had to interpreting the 
affirmative action provisions in the Canadian Charter.47 They explain that problems 
“arise where the state intervenes directly in the allocation of social benefits, and 
                                            
45 CQLR, c. C-12. 
46 See the honourable L. Canon’s remarks quoted at note 42 Chapter 3.  
47 Drumbl, Mark A. and Craig, John D.R., “Affirmative Action in Question:  A Coherent Theory for Section 15(2)”, 
Vol. IV, No.1 (1997) Review of Constitutional Studies, 80 at 86. 
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prescribes an allocation based on personal characteristics which are irrelevant to the 
issue of whether individuals want or need the social benefit”.48 If the State is perhaps 
not the appropriate organ to remedy these inequalities, then should the private sector 
not be given some flexibility to assist in rectifying structurally ingrained inequality? If 
so, then discouraging participation in Industry Challenges through laws like PPIPS 
and PIPEDA seems counterproductive.  
In addition to being a form or marketing, responding to Industry Challenges and 
publishing workforce demographics on internet pages or promotional materials, fulfills 
a social justice function. It is a way for industry to inform the public about the lower 
than average participation of certain members of a Target Group in a given industry 
and the measures it is taking to help remedy this. It also serves to inform members of 
the Target Group that the company is a welcoming or “equal opportunity employer”. It 
may challenge competing companies in the same sector to better their statics thereby 
using competition and the marketplace to affect social change. It may raise public 
awareness to the systematic discrimination encountered by members of a Target 
Group as well as help fight negative stereotyping of the group in question. Arguably, 
preventing an organisation from collecting, using, and communicating employee 
information to promote social change constitutes a deleterious effect that outweighs 
the salutary effects of PPIPS and PIPEDA.  
5.2.5.3 Weighing the Salutary and the Deleterious Effects 
of PPIPS and PIPEDA 
A weighing of the salutary and deleterious effects of PPIPS’ and PIPEDA’s 
                                            
48 Ibid., at 88. 
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impairment of a company’s right to express itself commercially, especially within the 
context of an Industry Challenge, should encourage the legislator to reconsider the 
effect of these laws. While the ability to control one’s Personal Information, and 
thereby retain some dignity and autonomy in the workplace, is important, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, a risk analysis of the real damage that might be caused to the 
employee in this context reveals a low potential for harm – especially given the 
security measures enumerated above that can be put in place to prevent a misuse of 
personal information. Continuing to prevent the repurposing and communication of 
this information, however, deprives the consumer of important information they 
require to make an informed choice about the goods or services they are purchasing, 
risks diminishing the competitiveness of Quebec business, and discourages the 
private sector from engaging in initiatives aimed at remedying social inequalities.  
**** 
The U.F.C.W. case that forced change to Alberta PIPA and recognised a union’s right 
to express itself, is a recent reminder that rights, even Canadian Charter protected 
ones, are not absolute but require balancing and defining according to what is 
reasonable in the circumstances. In light of this case, it is not inconceivable that an 
organisation challenge PPIPS and PIPEDA for preventing it from expressing itself 
commercially by restricting its ability to collect, use, and communicate Personal 
Information on employees without their consent in response to an Industry Challenge. 
Applying the analysis set out in Oakes, a company might argue that while PPIPS’ and 
PIPEDA’s objectives may still seem worthy and the legislation rationally connected to 
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these, the impairment PIPEDA inflicts is more than minimal. Additionally, in that both 
laws limit a form of commercial expression, and therefore risk depriving consumers of 
information necessary to make informed decisions, threatening the competitiveness 
of Quebec businesses, and discouraging private sector participation in affirmative 
action type programs, their overall impediment, in the case of an Industry Challenge, 
outweighs their benefit.   
 
 
Chapter 6.  
Conclusion: Pining Down Proteus  
In R. v. Tessling, Binnie J describes privacy as a protean concept.1 Jean-Louis 
Halpérin, referred to in the introduction to this essay, also believes privacy to be a 
concept best represented as a shifting border between many, often conflicting, 
interests.2 The challenge in any given situation is to establish where the border should 
be drawn. The present essay uses the example of Industry Challenges (as defined in 
the Introduction) to explore where, in Quebec, the limit might be traced between a 
company’s need to use workforce demographics to advertise its goods and services – 
a form of commercial expression - and its employees’ right to keep Personal 
Information (as defined in Chapter 3) confidential. At present, the latter’s rights are 
protected both provincially, by an Act Respecting the Protection of Personal 
Information In the Private Sector3 and federally, by the Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act4.  
This essay briefly reviews privacy protection in jurisdictions with the greatest legal 
influence on Quebec and Canada: the European Union, the United States and the 
United Kingdom (Chapter 2). It demonstrates how a blend of these influences is 
reflected in the Quebec and Canadian approaches to privacy and how existing 
privacy legislation might prevent a company from effectively and efficiently 
responding to Industry Challenges (Chapter 3). Finally, the last two chapters 
                                            
1 R. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 431 at 445.  
2 Halpérin, Jean-Louis, “L’essor de la ‘privacy’ et l’usage des concepts juridiques”, Droit et Société 61/2005, 765 at 
775. 
3 Chapter P-39.1 (“PPIPS”). 
4 S.C. 2000, c. 5 (“PIPEDA”). 
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respectively explore the interpretive and legislative amendments that could be made 
to PPIPS and PIPEDA to enable companies to respond to Industry Challenges 
(Chapter 4) as well as the possible legal action a company could take on the ground 
that Quebec’s privacy legislation violates its right to express itself commercially under 
s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms5 (Chapter 5). This study 
leads to the following concluding observations.  
6.1 Growing Pains? 
The evident tension between legislation such as PPIPS and PIPEDA and Industry 
Challenges may simply be a symptom of growing pains in the transition from the third 
to the fourth wave of privacy concerns and protection. While the third wave’s 
concerns are still relevant, new market trends and demands, not to mention the 
technology and the new uses of information it generates, raise many new privacy 
questions characteristic of the fourth wave. 
Responding to these requires more than ascertaining whether privacy is a right or a 
concept and, if a right, what type of right. These inquiries are ultimately sterile 
especially if as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, in the United Kingdom, privacy may 
not be recognized as a right per se but still be protected, whereas in Canada, it may 
be recognized as a right but may have to cede or adapt itself to other equally 
important rights and societal concerns. Aharon Barak captures this subtlety and the 
judge’s role in preserving it in what he terms the: “the constitutional dialectic”, 
explaining that: 
                                            
5 Constitution Act, 1982 R.S.C., 1985, App.II, no 44.. 
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“human rights and the limitations on them derive from the same source. 
They reflect the same values. Human rights can be limited, but there 
are limits to the limitations. The role of the judge in a democracy is to 
preserve both of these limitations. Judges must ensure the security and 
existence of the state as well as the realization of human rights; they 
must determine and protect the integrity of the proper balance.”6 
Ultimately a less theoretical a more practical approach may be necessary. 
6.2 A Pragmatic Approach  
Until the transition from the third wave to the fourth is complete and the extent of the 
real privacy concerns characteristic of the fourth wave can be ascertained, at least in 
the case of Industry Challenges, existing tools can conceivably be leveraged to meet 
the needs of industry while respecting individual privacy. As suggested by Gratton in 
Chapter 4, a purposive interpretation of PPIPS and PIPEDA, grounded in a risk 
assessment of the actual harm suffered by an individual in the event of a breach, may 
be adapted to understand what amendments, interpretive as well as legislative, could 
be made to this legislation to provide business with the information it requires to 
respond to an Industry Challenge without noticeably increasing the risk of harm to the 
individual.   
Another approach would be to leverage existing fair information practices (“FIP”s) 
differently to respond to the privacy concerns Industry Challenges present. This last 
point is made by Tene and Polonetsky albeit in response to privacy challenges posed 
by Big Data.7 For example, if consent poses an obstacle to industry, perhaps the 
                                            
6 Barak, Aharon, “Proportionality Effect: The Israeli Experience”, (2007), 57 University of Toronto Law Journal 369 
at 382.  
7 Tene, Omer and Polonetsky, Jules, “Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property (2013) at 3. 
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consent requirements could be reduced while ensuring the same or a better level of 
protection for the individual by emphasizing data integrity and enforcement.  
A second approach suggested by Tene and Polonetsky would be to shift the focus of 
privacy legislation away from users to business.8 Data protection would thus become 
a governance issue just like, and perhaps at par with, diversity and environmental 
sustainability. Tene and Polonetsky note that this approach: 
“signifies a paradigm shift from privacy law to data protection regulation, 
which, while concerned with privacy, has other goals, such as setting 
standards for the quality of personal information and ensuring that 
individuals and businesses are able to process information about others 
for various legitimate ends.” 9  
They demonstrate how making privacy a governance issue is more effective than 
legislating by quoting a comparative study by Mullingan and Bamberger that proves 
how by making privacy a governance issue and appointing privacy officers, United 
States businesses “have seen privacy grow from the ground up, whereas European 
businesses often settle for privacy ‘on the books’”.10 Moreover, there are advantages 
of working with existing tools. 
                                            
8 Tene, Omer and Polonetsky, Jules, “To Track or ‘Do Not Track” Advancing Transparency and Individual Control 
in Online Behavioral Advertising”, 2012, Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology,  Vol. 13.1. at 48. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., at 49.  
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6.3 Advantages 
At least two arguments militate in favor of working with existing tools. These are: 1. 
the global nature of the privacy challenge, and 2. the course already being charted by 
Canadian courts.  
6.3.1 Privacy in a Global Context 
The global presence of American companies in jurisdictions that, similar to Quebec, 
have strong privacy protection legislation, suggests that Quebec companies are not 
alone in dealing with local legislation that hinders their commercial interests. Charting 
a course that is starkly different for other jurisdictions will affect global integration. 
Indeed, since the data protection laws (“DLP”s) and FIPs that emerged around the 
world during the third wave of privacy protection are very similar and mutually 
integrated, a radical change in course through drastically new legislation would cause 
tremendous disruption. Gratton explains this disruption in reference to the definition of 
Personal Information by noting that providing for an interpretation instead of 
proposing a new wording of the definition may avoid having to completely reopen the 
‘control’ conception of privacy, which is the basis of DPLs adopted all over the 
world.”11 She further argues that “[i]t is always less problematic to provide a solution 
that will be incorporated within the current legal framework […], such as a proposed 
interpretation, than to propose something completely new.”12 Although less certain 
than a legislative amendment, working with present tools will make efforts easier to 
coordinate internationally. 
                                            
11 Gratton, Eloise, Understanding Personal Information: Managing Privacy Risks, Markham, ON, Lexis Nexis 
Canada Inc., 2013 at 147. 
12 Ibid., at 152. 
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6.3.2 Jurisprudential Consistency 
A second reason for not drastically changing existing privacy legislation and opting 
instead for a more informal means of protecting privacy is the flexibility it offers the 
courts to decide, case by case, where to erect the border between privacy and other 
interests. It is also in keeping with the course the courts have charted in decisions 
such as Englander v. Telus Communication.13 In reference to the balance PIPEDA 
must maintain between the individual’s right to privacy and the organisation’s right to 
collect, use, and communicate Personal Information, the Federal Court advocates 
“flexibility, common sense and pragmatism”14. Likewise, in Alberta (Information and 
Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401 the 
Supreme Court of Canada chastises the legislator for a law that restricts a union’s 
right to use Personal Information “without regard for the nature of the personal 
information, the purpose for which it is collected, used or disclosed, and the 
situational context for that information”.15 It would appear, therefore, that the courts 
have already adopted a purposive approach to weed out the aspects of PPIPS and 
PIPEDA that are perhaps dated or inappropriate in a given circumstance without 
calling for a complete overhaul of the privacy legislation in question. 
**** 
To return, then, to the question posed at the beginning of this essay: “what is 
privacy?” perhaps the best answer is not a legal definition at all but rather an image. 
                                            
13 2004 FCA 387 (CanLII). 
14 Ibid., at para. 46.  
15 [2013] 3. S.C.R. 733 at 749. 
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That image is the one used by Justice Binnie: the image of Proteus. As societies 
transition into the fourth wave, privacy resembles, more than ever the water god, who 
can foretell the future, but who will change shapes to avoid having to do so. Instead of 
trying in vain to pin it down, once and for all, privacy may be best left to define on a 
case by case basis and in consideration of the applicable legislation and 
jurisprudence. Although less certain than a legislative definition of the concept, 
judicial interpretation may prove the only mechanism sufficiently flexible to truly 
protect a concept like privacy that, while illusive, is not dead, and indeed 
fundamentally important to human, social, economic, and political development.   
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